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Re-validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance
George P. Smith, 11*

INTRODUCTION

The law of nuisance has long been seen as the heart of real property

law-this because of its distributive and re-distributive force in land use.'
Put simply, nuisance law controls the manner in which people use their
property. It does this through the use of a deceptively simple balancing test
wherein the gravity of harm resulting to one party as a consequence of
another's use of his property is weighed against the social utility arising
from the original use. 2 It is through use of this construct that a
determination is made when a use of land is so unreasonable as to cause
injury to others.3 In its present form, while often ad hoc in application, 4 a
nuisance is defined generally as merely some interference with the "use and
enjoyment of the land.",5 As will be seen, the most common remedy to
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America; B.S., J.D., Indiana University;
LL.M., Columbia University; LL.D. Indiana University. I acknowledge the research assistance of two
former students in the preparation of this article: Bethany M. Bums and Jeffrey P. Ferrier.
1. See generally George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658 (1995) (using
nuisance law as a paradigm to consider the development of the principle of reasonableness). Indeed,
both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution place property rights on the
same level of centrality to American society as life and liberty. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § I
(stating that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1979). Those factors to be weighed or
balanced in assessing the gravity of the offending harm to the plaintiff versus the utility of the offender's
conduct consist of:
(a) [t]he extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of
the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Id. § 827. In assessing "the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct[,]"
not only will "the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality" be considered, but also "the
impractability of preventing or avoiding the invasion." Id. § 828; see infra notes 60-69 and
accompanying text (analyzing the Restatement's balancing test in more depth).
3. See Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Public Swimming Pool as Nuisance, 49 A.L.R. 3d 652,
654-55 (1973) (defining nuisance and describing how a swimming pool can rise to the level of a
nuisance).
4. See John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of
Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 18-32 (observing that many nuisance decisions are fact sensitive and,
thus, defy efforts to seek a cohesiveness in nuisance law).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. d (1979). Richard A. Epstein asserts that
only an actual physical invasion of protected interests gives rise to a prima facie case of tort liability.
Richard A. Epstein, NuisanceLaw: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
49, 57 (1979). For him, the identification of an invasion has far greater import than selecting a proper
remedy to redress the invasion itself. Id.at 101; Richard A. Epstein, Causationand CorrectiveJustice:
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abate a nuisance is injunctive relief in equity.6 Yet, judicial creativity has
been seen through the use of such remedies as awards of permanent
damages 7 and the compensated injunction
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance is brought into focus normally
when a moving party is seeking to prevent commencement of what is
alleged will become a nuisance. 9 While recognized in both state and federal
common law for many years,'0 it is under-utilized because of the high
burden of proof (e.g., reasonable certainty or high probability)"' normally
set legislatively' 2 or through judicial interpretation and practice.' 3
In order to re-validate the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance and
"contemporize" its inherent value to modem lawmaking' 4-and particularly
to environmental management'-the thesis of this article is simple and
A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477,480 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (enjoining the
owners of a pulp mill from operating their plant, in which they had invested more than one million
dollars, because it was a nuisance).
7. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (ordering the defendant
cement company to compensate the injured landowners with permanent damages in return for the
landowners' agreement not to sue in the future over the dust the plant created); see also Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, DistinguishingBetween Consensualand NonconsensualAdvantages of Liability Rules, 105
YALE L.J. 235, 252 (1995) (arguing damages should be preferred to equitable relief because an award of
damages forces parties to reveal private information).
8. E.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). In Spur, the court
ordered a compensated injunction. Id at 708. This meant that while the court recognized that the plant
was a nuisance to the residents of Sun City, it determined that because Sun City, in part, came to the
nuisance, it should indemnify the feed plant's owners for the cost of moving the plant. Id. While a
unique form of relief, it is inherently a fair one and should be used more frequently. "Money damages
Eric A. Posner, Law
are the superior remedy when the nuisance creates anger and hard feelings ....
and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2010 (2001). When emotions, however, are unlikely to interfere
with bargaining, injunctions should be regarded as preferred. Id. But see Ward Farnsworth, The
Economics ofEnmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 211, 261 (2002) (suggesting enmity between parties should be
disregarded totally by the law and seen, rather, as a complex vector of economical and ethical forces
created by the parties themselves to be dealt with by them).
9. See generally Charles J. Doane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern Doctrine
in AnticipatoryNuisancefor Enjoining Improbable Threats ofCatastrophicHarm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 441, 443 (1990) (noting that "[i]n some instances, a court may go so far as to enjoin as an
anticipatory or prospective nuisance activity that has not yet caused harm, but threatens to do so").
10. See generally Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 627 (1988) (presenting a historical look
at the doctrine's use in state and federal courts).
11. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 644-45 (noting that plaintiffs are turned off by the fact that
courts applying the doctrine often require nuisance per se).
12. Id. at 645-48 (referring to the statutes of Alabama and Georgia--the only two states acting
legislatively in this area); see infra Part II.C.
13. E.g., Fink v. Bd. of Trs., 218 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Il. App. Ct. 1966), quoted in Vill. of
Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (Il1. 1981).
14. See generally Doane, supra note 9 (arguing that the doctrine must be changed as a result of
modem technology).
15. See Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law Theory
for Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 223, 224, 239
(1995) (discussing the viability of anticipatory nuisance as a way for "plaintiffs to prevent the siting of
waste facilities in their communities").
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direct: by greater judicial care and insight in applying the traditional
balancing test to include a weighing of both the probability and the
magnitude of an injury, equitably nuanced and practical decisionmaking
will occur.' 6 Similarly, with legislative foresight, efforts should be made to
define and clarify with greater specificity what evidentiary proofs must be
submitted in order to establish, for example, a reasonable certainty of
harm 17 necessary to trigger injunctive relief. As will be seen, however,
these two suggestions for re-validation are fraught with historical rigidities
and a judicial and legislative reluctance to stray from the status quo. Given
this situation, re-education will be slow, but will certainly occur over time.
I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Although the origins of nuisance law date back to thirteenth-century
England when it was known as the assize of nuisance,"8 it was not until
1611, with the introduction and acceptance of the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (so use your own property so as not to injure your
neighbors)-elevated to the status of a fundamental principle over timethat a right of dominion over property was recognized. With this new right
came a recognition that "each owner had a right to prevent neighbors from
using land in a manner that would interfere with the owner's quiet
enjoyment."' 9 This development, in turn, allowed the common law of
nuisance early on to begin shaping what today is seen as the contemporary
law of nuisance.20

16. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 645 ("For plaintiffs to view anticipatory nuisance as a feasible
and predictable doctrine, courts and legislatures must adopt a more coherent approach to its use.").
17. See Viii. of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 842 (Ryan, J., concurring) (proposing an alternative
balancing test which would allow "the court to consider a wider range of factors").
18. Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic
PropertyCases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 761, 765-72 (1979); WILLIAM L. PROSSER
& W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 617-18 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The assize of nuisance was recognized during the
thirteenth century and covered invasions of the plaintiffs land caused by conduct on the defendant's
land. Id.at 617. This was a criminal action that provided for civil relief. Id.; see also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 2 (1987) (describing the
first cause of action in tort that arose in the twelfth century as the intentional tort, which allowed
damages to be recovered through the writ of trespass vi et armis in cases of battery).
19. James M. McElfish, Jr., Property Rights, Property Roots: Rediscovering the Basis for
Legal Protection of the Environment, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10231, 10231 (1994).
20. Early nuisance actions were allowed originally only for freehold estates but, by around
1500, this action was allowed for nonfreeholds as well. Coquillette, supra note 18, at 765-75.
Additionally, the remedy of a nuisance action was solely a criminal one until the sixteenth century when
it became possible for an individual to bring a civil action in tort. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at
618.
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Sic utere was introduced specifically into the common law of England
in Aldred's Case in 1611.2 1 There, the court found that the social utility of
a pig sty was not sufficient to justify the maintenance of the nuisance it
created to a neighboring property owner and ordered the sty removed.22
Following the letter and spirit of the maxim of sic utere, this holding
protected the offended property owner from external harm (e.g., the sight
and smell of the sty). Thus, the offending landowner was not allowed to
use his property in a way injurious to another's property interest. 23 It is
here that the first attempt of a judicial balancing of interests or harms or
centrality
utilities was undertaken. It is also here where the undergirding
24
reasonableness.
found:
are
maxim
the
of
flexibility
and the
In America, in 1884, the same principle of reasonableness was
validated when it was recognized that "every substantial, material right of
person or property is entitled to protection against all the world. It is by
protecting the most humble in his small estate against the encroachments of
large capital and large interests that the poor man is ultimately enabled to
become a capitalist himself., 25 Seventeenth-century courts protected the
right of landowners to be free from "foul smells, uncomfortable
21. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). In this case, the plaintiff brought an
action to end the operation of a pig sty near his home, claiming that it polluted the air and blocked
sunlight from his windows. Id. at 817; see also Coquillette, supra note 18, at 773-75 (noting that the
defendant "claimed social utility as a defense to a nuisance action" for the first time in Aldred's Case);
Smith, supra note 1, at 683-86 (discussing at length the holding in Aldred's Case).
22. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817, 822; see also Coquillette, supra note 18, at 775
(discussing the social utility defense in Aldred's Case). The defendant tried to use a social utility
defense, stating "the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man." Aldred's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817. The court did not accept this defense, saying that the neighbor's use was not
sufficient justification for the nuisance. Id. at 821-22. But see Tal S. Grinblat, Offenses to the Olfactory
Senses and the Law of Nuisance, 21 LEGAL MED. Q. 1 (1997) (expounding upon the modem view of pig
sties).
23. The court did limit future application of this doctrine by saying that only matters of
"necessity" are actionable. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821. The court distinguished between
matters of "necessity" and "delight." Id.
24. See Meeks v. Wood, 118 N.E. 591 (Ind. App. 1918) (implying that the reasonableness of
the alleged nuisance should be considered); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 174-75. A satirical
synopsis of the reasonable man standard is as follows: "[the reasonable man] will inform himself of the
history and habits of a dog before administering a caress ... [and] never drives his ball until those in
front of him have definitely vacated the putting-green which is his own objective .... In all that mass
of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable
woman." Id; see also Smith, supra note 1, at 663 (drawing the conclusion that reasonableness
incorporates the concept of economic efficiency, equitable balancing, and the sic utere maxim).
25. Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co. 18 F. 753, 807 (Cal. Dist. Ct.'App. 1884).
The court continued by observing:
If the smaller interest must yield to the larger, all small property rights, and all
smaller and less important enterprises, industries, and pursuits would sooner or
later be absorbed by the large, more powerful few; and their development to a
condition of great value and importance, both to the individual and the public,
would be arrested in its incipiency.
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temperatures, [and] excessive noise" if the questioned activity was judged
to be of sufficient magnitude to constitute a nuisance. 26 In evaluating the
facts of each case, courts were generally disposed to consider the costs
owners more intensely than the social
imposed on neighboring property
27
activity.
challenged
the
of
utility
During the formative period, the courts also considered issues of future
harm. Lord Chancellor Brougham, confronted with claims of potential
future injuries-or anticipatory nuisance-in Ripon v. Hobart, utilized a
"practical and rational view" to arrive at a test requiring a judicial weighing
of the "magnitude of the evil against the chances of its occurrence" when
considering relief here.28
Interestingly, the courts of that day did not employ the Brougham
test-perhaps, no doubt, choosing to defer to what were considered to be
greater economic interests. Rather, they chose to focus on the uncertainty
of any resulting harm. 29 Because of this positioning, and the heavy
emphasis on actual harm, most claims to enjoin prospective nuisances were
rejected.30
A. The IndustrialRevolution
Despite the early precedent of Ripon v. Hobart, torts "remained a
neglected and undeveloped backwater until well into the nineteenth
century.",31 The advent of the Industrial Revolution and its technological
advances created a surge in tort litigation and an evolution of the law of
nuisance. 32 The "inherently conservative view of property... limited
intensive and innovative uses of land [that] by the early 19th century,
conflicted with the needs of a developing U.S. economy., 33 As a result, a
judicial modification of the common law doctrines of property, such as sic

26. Coquillette, supra note 18, at 770-71.
27. Id. at 820-21. The court in Aldred's Case, however, did consider social utility. See Smith
supra note 1, at 684-86 (noting that the defendant raised a claim of social utility as a defense).
28. Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65, 68 (1834).
29. Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-EntrepreneurialNuisance Injunctions-Avoiding
the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621, 625-26 (1976).
30. Id.at 624; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § i.
31. Doane, supra note 9, at 444. In the middle of the nineteenth century, within a few decades,
a great deal of literature was published on torts. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW chs. 3-4 (1881) (detailing the tort claims of trespass and nuisance).
32. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409 (1973); LANDES & POSNER, supra note

18, at 2-3; see also Larry D. Silver, The Common Law of Environmental Risk and Some Recent
Applications, 10 HARe. ENVTL. L. REv. 61, 74 (1986) (describing the change of the focus of the
common law of nuisance from sic utere to a utilitarian balancing approach).
33. McElfish, supranote 19, at 10231.
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utere was effected in order
"to keep pace with evolving expectations about
34
use."
property
reasonable
An equitable action to abate a nuisance can be brought against either a
private or public wrong. 35 "[A] private nuisance is a civil wrong based
[upon a] disturbance of rights in land while a public nuisance is... an
interference with the rights of the community at large. 36 Governmental
agencies generally protect the rights of the public at large under the public
nuisance doctrine and environmental statutes. Private nuisance, on the
other hand, is the mechanism by which individuals protect their personal
use and enjoyment of their land.37
One of the first industrial-era private nuisance cases was St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping.38 Following the doctrine of sic utere, the court
articulated a reasonable-point-of-view standard for determining whether
there was a visible diminution of the plaintiff's property value. 39 The
defendant argued that the court should consider whether the defendant's
activities would add more than a minimal nuisance in light of existing
industrial activities in the same locale. 4 The jury found, despite the
presence of several other factories, that the defendant's smelting company
had visibly diminished the value of the plaintiffs property and, although
the company was not enjoined from its activity, dramatic damages were
levied against the smelting company. 4'

34. Id.
35. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (mentioning both private
and public causes of action based upon nuisance while discussing a state's ability to impose confiscatory
regulations or exactions). When Lucas is combined with Nollan v. Cal. CoastalComm "n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987)-and especially Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)-a template emerges for
structuring an objective standard for testing (or, largely solving) the contentious takings puzzle. In
Dolan, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the property-police power balance is to be found within
the common law of each state by and through application of the law of nuisance. Dolan, 512 U.S. at
390; see Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves The Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995) (suggesting that the Dolan court "solved the takings puzzle ... [by]
calibrat[ing] the property-police power balance"); Smith, supra note 1, at 695 n.258 (citing cases and
secondary materials that illustrate diverging views between the government and property owners
regarding the reasonable use of property).
36. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Ct. App. 1971) (citing
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 594 (3d ed. 1964)).
37. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 619.

38. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (1865); see Smith, supra note 1, at
686-88 (describing at length the decision in the St. Helen's case); Coquillette, supra note 18, at 782-91
(describing the balancing of utilities doctrine in conjunction with the St. Helen's case).
39. St. Helen's Smelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1487.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1484. Although the jury found that the smelting company was operating in an
ordinary and proper manner, the jury held that the company was not operating in a proper area and
therefore made the company pay Tipping £361 in damages. Id.
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Further defining an action in private nuisance, the court introduced the
concept of economic balancing in the case of Richard's Appeal.4 2 In that
case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered enjoining the
operation of an iron works that was located in a residential neighborhood.43
The court, in evaluating the capital investment in the iron works and the
employment opportunities created by it, found that granting injunctive relief
could cause more injury than a refusal. 44 It held that the injury caused to
one landowner did not justify injunctive relief when enjoining the disputed
activity would cause severe economic hardship. This economic balancing
in turn "redefined the character of 19th century nuisance law [and]
'represented the thinking of courts into the 20th century."'' 45 Describing the
critical components of a nuisance action, yet another nineteenth-century
court established that a nuisance action for an injunction could not succeed
if the offending activity was legal, reasonable, and carried on in an
appropriate place.46 All of these cases, taken together, reflect an adoption
of a reasonableness standard and the concurrently emerging economic
analysis that emphasizes balancing the utilities and reasonableness. 47
Although the balancing of the utilities doctrine, or balancing the
equities, 48 originated in England, it found favor and took root only in the
United States.49 The balancing doctrine looks at both the reasonableness
and utility of the defendant's activities and is commonly articulated as
whether "a reasonable person would conclude that the amount of the harm
done outweighs the benefits served by the conduct." 50 A persistent
underlying theme in the balancing is an economic analysis that is
represented by the discussion of the utility of the activities or the equity of
enjoining the activities. 5'
B. Balancing:A JudicialMechanismfor Implementing Social Policy
During the nineteenth century, nuisance became a tool for adjusting the
rights of industrial and residential landowners as their respective uses of
42. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); see Smith, supra note I, at 690 (discussing, in detail,
the economic analysis used by the court in Richard'sAppeal).
43. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. at 113-14.
44. Id.
45. Smith, supra note 1, at 690 (quoting Kurtz, supra note 29, at 658).
46. Hole v. Barlow, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1118 (C.P. 1858).
47. MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 28 (1992); Kurtz, supra note 29, at 658.
48. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 631.

49. Kurtz, supra note 29, at 670.
50. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 630.

51. Kurtz, supra note 29, at 658; see also Smith, supra note 1, at 690-91 (discussing the
economic analysis employed by courts after the Richard'sAppeal case).
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property increasingly conflicted with one another. 52 There was an
imperative of economic development and this "provoke[d] political and
social pressures that result[ed] in efforts to restrict or alter property
relationships in the name of the public interest or a more democratic
conception of economic liberty." 53 As Richard A. Posner suggests, the
common law of torts is best explained in terms of positivistic economic
theory.54 As a result, the courts, in the process of balancing, were solicitous
of economic progress by applying nuisance law carefully in a manner to
avoid retarding industrial and technological development. 55 This shift of
the reasonableness standard-from a strict sic utere approach to balancing
the utilities-created a judicial subsidy for developing industries by
allowing them to impose the cost of their by-products on society in
general.56
Although the anticipatory nuisance doctrine and nuisance law did not
generally go through any significant change during the nineteenth century,57
scholarly thought on the subject changed greatly. The Restatement of Torts
essentially adopted Lord Chancellor Brougham's practical and rational
approach that weighs the potential harm and the certainty of the harm to
evaluate nuisance actions for future harmsf 8 The Restatement considers
imminence and seriousness of harm separately stating that both must be
52. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and PrivateRemedies, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1403, 1439 (1983) ("The industrial revolution spawned nuisance litigation by farmers and
homeowners on the troubled frontier of new technologies against textile mills, blast furnaces, hydraulic
mines, and cement plants."). Today, "[t]he majority of nuisance cases concern complaints of discomfort
or inconvenience caused by noise or smell." R.A. BUCKLEY, THE LAW OF NUISANCE 23 (2d ed. 1996).
53. Herman Belz, Property and Liberty Reconsidered, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1992)
(reviewing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992)).
54. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (4th ed. 1992); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). "These texts together serve as a touchstone for what is
known as the Law and Economics movement. The movement's main tenet is that many legal issues can
and ought to be decided so that social benefits outweigh social costs." Richard H. Seeburger, Book
Review, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
55. Furrow, supra note 52, at 1441-42 nn.171-72. Different standards of care were used for
factories and railroads than were used for individual property owners. Id.
56. See generally Smith, supra note I (discussing the evolution of the reasonableness standard
and the reasonable man).
57. Fear of risk of harm became a cognizable nuisance action in this period. WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 577 (4th ed. 1971). However, following the turn of the
century, a claim of fear of future harms became much more difficult to support. Id. Courts began
considering the location of the nuisance, whether the fear was reasonable, and uncertain risks. See Bd.
of Health v. N. Am. Home, 78 A. 677, 678 (N.J. Ch. 1910) (discussing the location of the facility); Hays
v. Hartfield L-P Gas, 306 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that fear a propane tank will
explode and injure neighbors is insufficient to establish a nuisance).
58. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 933 cmt. b (1939) (clarifying that "seriousness and
imminence ... must be considered together"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. b (1979)
(restating verbatim from the 1939 edition); Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65, 68 (1834).
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considered but that a high degree of one of the elements could justify a
grant for injunction.5 9
C. The Restatement's BalancingTest: Defining Reasonableness
Today, a court deciding a nuisance case undertakes a balancing test
whereby it examines two major considerations.6 First, it will consider
whether there is proof of substantial harm to the land; in other words,
whether a tort has been committed on the land.6' Second, a court will
undertake a balancing test based on the Restatement of Torts sections 827
and 828.62 This balancing test, which has developed into the heart of
nuisance law, 63 entails balancing the gravity of the harm that the activity
sought to be enjoined has caused, or will cause, 64 against the utility of the
good in allowing the activity to continue.65
In assessing the gravity of the harm, the Restatement seeks to evaluate
factors such as "[t]he extent of the harm"; "the character of the harm"; the
social value attached to the type of use in question; the suitability of the
particular use to the locality; and the burden on the harmed individual to
avoid the harm.6 6 On the other side of the balancing scale, a court considers
factors such as "the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose

59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. b (1979) ("The seriousness and imminence
of the threat are in a sense independent of each other ....).
60. Smith, supra note 1, at 688-94 (detailing the history of the balancing approach and
contemporary practice). The author asserts "that balancing does in fact occur throughout the whole
decisional process of analysis in determining whether a set of actions are reasonable or unreasonable."
Id.at 692 (emphasis omitted).
61. Charles L. Hellerich, Note, Imminent IrreparableInjury: A Needfor Reform, 45 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1025, 1030 (1972); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 618 (observing that "a private
nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land").
62. In addition to these two requirements, courts also require the plaintiff to establish that an
action in equity for nuisance is necessary because an action at law will not provide adequate relief.
Doane, supra note 9, at 451.
63. See George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic
Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 60-61 (1991) (discussing the origins of
the balancing of hardships analysis as seen in Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868)). Because of its
inextricable relationship to negligence as well as its dependence upon the standard of reasonableness,
which is uncertain and unpredictable, private nuisance is seen as "a vulnerable tort." Maria Lee, What is
PrivateNuisance?, 119 LAW Q. REV. 298, 325 (2003).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979) (discussing the "Gravity of HarmFactors Involved").
65. Id.§ 828 (describing "Utility of Conduct-Factors Involved"); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 35 (2000) ("[C]ourts are interested in two kinds
of factors [when determining nuisance issues]: a utilitarian calculus of the relative social value of the
conflicting activities and a justice-oriented consideration of what constitutes a fair distribution of the
benefits and burdens of land ownership.").
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979).
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of the conduct"; the suitability of the conduct in its present67 locality; and
"the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion."
If a court determines that a specific use of land is unreasonable or that
the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the good, then it will find
the activity to be a nuisance.68 If and when an activity is found to be a
nuisance, the court will mandate an appropriate remedy. As stated earlier,
there are a variety of possible remedies, the most common of which is
enjoining the unreasonable use of the land and restoring to the plaintiff the
enjoyment of his land.69
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE
As the phrase implies and has been seen, anticipatory nuisance is
simply a nuisance action which is brought before the unreasonable use has
occurred. While seemingly a useful and resources-saving doctrine,70
anticipatory nuisance is really a relatively seldom used common law cause
of action.7 1 In essence, the doctrine gives courts "[t]he power to interfere
by injunction to restrain a party from so using his own
property as to
72
neighbor.,
his
of
rights
the
prejudice
materially
or
destroy

67. Id. § 828.
68. Williams, supra note 15, at 240 (stating that "[a]n interference is 'unreasonable' when the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct"). It is argued that because the test of
reasonableness is ambiguous and misleading, the courts are-in nuisance actions-determining whether
it is proper to apply a standard of strict liability. Indeed, private nuisance may well become absorbed by
a "new" reformulated tort of strict liability. Lee, supra note 63, at 325.
69. See Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 700 (W. Va. 1974) (upholding the trial court's
order permanently enjoining the defendant from utilizing his property as a salvage yard because the
property was in a residential area and constituted a nuisance); see also Hulbert v. Cal. Portland Cement
Co., 118 P. 928 (Cal. 1911). In Hulbert, the Supreme Court of California affirmed an injunction that
ordered defendant's cement plant to cease operations. Id.at 930. The court, while recognizing that
"petitioner's business is a very important enterprise" and closing it would be a hardship, nonetheless
ruled that the injunction was appropriate because the cement plant's operation was destroying plaintiff's
citrus trees. Id.at 930, 932. But see Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In a
case that was similar factually to Hulbert, the New York Court of Appeals, instead of closing defendants
cement plant outright, ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiff with "permanent damages"
based on the diminution in value of plaintiffs land. Id. at 873, 875. The court, after balancing the
equities, concluded that this was the most equitable result as the defendant was able to continue to reap
return on his investment and the plaintiff was compensated for the damage. Id
70. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 129 (1873) (recognizing the doctrine); Olsen v.
City of Baton Rouge, 247 So. 2d 889, 894 (La. Ct. App. 1971), applicationdenied, 252 So. 2d 454 (La.
1971) (emphasizing that "[tlhe general rule is that courts will not grant injunctions of anticipatory
nuisances"); State ex rel. Vill. of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque, 889 P.2d 185,
200 (N.M. 1994) (stating that "[tihe general rule is that anticipatory nuisance is a valid cause of action");
see also Sharp, supra note 10, at 627-28 (stating that while seldom used, the doctrine is recognized in
the common law of most states).
72. Adams, 38 Md. at 125.
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The judicial disdain underlying anticipatory nuisance is that the
plaintiff is asking a court to rule that a proposed use of land is unreasonable
before the use actually occurs. This has been referred to as the "despotism"
of the anticipatory nuisance concept.7 3 This despotism, because it prevents
landowners from doing with their land as they please or deem reasonable,
makes most courts hesitant to enjoin a proposed action without the plaintiff
first meeting a very high burden of proof.74 In Holke v. Herman, the
Missouri Court of Appeals, in deciding whether the plaintiff could enjoin
his neighbor from digging a pond on his property that the plaintiff feared
would fill with polluted, noxious drainage," summarized the judicial
disdain for anticipatory injunctions when it stated:
In most instances the disposition is to wait until the dread is
justified by the event. Experience has demonstrated that a
meddlesome, interfering policy represses the spontaneous energy
and many-sided activity, which arises naturally from self-interest
and differences of taste and inclination among men and constitute
of our laws is chary about
the true springs of progress. The spirit 76
regulating conduct or restricting action.
Even after making this pronouncement, the court did go on to recognize that
plaintiffs may have a right to avoid an anticipated harm. The court stated
that "the call for protection against an apprehended injury, reasonably
certain to befall,77 is as imperative as that for relief from one now felt."78
The crux of anticipatory nuisance actions, like regular nuisance action,
is a balancing test "plus." By this it is meant that, as with a regular
nuisance action, a court faced with an anticipatory nuisance action should
balance the plaintiffs' rights to protect themselves from apparent threats of
injury (the gravity of the harm) against the defendants' rights to use their
property as they wish (the utility of the good). 79 The "plus" is that in

73. Doane, supra note 9, at 452.
74. See id.("Citing the 'despotism' inherent to preventing landowners from using their
property as they please, courts traditionally are reluctant to enjoin threatening activity before it causes
injury."); see, e.g., City ofAlbuquerque, 889 P.2d at 200 (stating "that the anticipated nuisance must be
proven so as to make any argument that it is not a nuisance highly improbable"); Cherokee Hills Util.
Dist. v. Stanley, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 1989) (noting that an
"[anticipatory nuisance will only be enjoined when [it is shown that] the injury is imminent and certain
to occur") (quoting Wallace v. Andersonville Docks Inc., 489 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)).
75. Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 133-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1901).
at 135.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test that courts
consider in an anticipatory nuisance action, which can be equated to requiring a high standard of proof).
78. Holke, 87 Mo. App. at 142.
79. See Doane, supra note 9, at 453 (discussing the weighing that a court will undertake).
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addition to the nuisance balancing test 80 a court faced with an anticipatory
nuisance case must decide what standard of imminence and severity the
plaintiff must establish before an injunction will issue.81 This is a standard
on which courts have not reached a consensus,8 2 but have reached some
guiding principles that this Article will now undertake to examine.
The practical and rational approach to assessing anticipatory nuisances,
created in 1834 by Lord Chancellor Brougham,83 was replaced by a variety
of standards ranging from a reasonable certainty of harm standard to a per
se nuisance requirement.84 The success of an anticipatory nuisance claim
depends largely, as observed, on the imminence and certainty of harm to the
plaintiff, and the standard courts employ reflects their level of need for both
of those elements. 85 However, the judiciary has failed to articulate a single
standard describing how imminently and with how much certainty a
defendant's conduct must threaten injury to the plaintiff before it may be
enjoined.8 6 The finding of imminent and certain harm has to overcome
"[t]he uncertainty of future events, the frequency of groundless alarms and
the despotism of needlessly
preventing a citizen from using his property
87
in ...his interest.,

80. In referring to the nuisance balancing test, I am referring to the test that is laid out in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-28 (1979). See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the factors utilized in applying this balancing).
81. Sharp, supra note 10, at 631-32.
82. See, e.g., Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 128-29 (1873) (requiring a showing of material
harm in one of the most oft cited anticipatory nuisance cases); State ex rel. Vill. of Los Ranchos de
Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque, 889 P.2d 185, 200 (N.M. 1994) (requiring high probability);
Cherokee Hills Util. Dist. v. Stanley, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429, at *20-21 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9,
1989) (requiring imminence and certainty, a standard which the plaintiffs did not meet); Duff v.
Morgantown Energy Assoc., 421 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W. Va. 1992) (requiring proof "beyond all ground of
fair questioning"); see also Doane, supra note 9, at 453 ("Courts have failed. . . to arrive at a single,
clearly articulated definition of how imminently a defendant's conduct must threaten injury to a plaintiff
before it can be enjoined.").
83. Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65 (1834). Modernly in England, Section 80(1) of The
Environmental Protection Act of 1990 provides for the issuance of an abatement notice "where a local
authority is satisfied that a statutory nuisance exists, or is likely to occur or recur" in its area. The
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 80 (Eng.). The Act continues by listing those actions
considered to be statutory nuisances which present a condition "prejudicial to health" (e.g., smoke
emitted, fumes of gas, dust, and steam). Id. § 79(1).
84. Hellerich, supra note 61, at 1030-37. Indeed, one prominent commentator takes the view
that an anticipatory nuisance will not be enjoined unless it is first shown to be a nuisance per se.
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.03 (2003).
85. Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1901).
86. Sharp, supra note 10, at 630-32.
87. Holke, 87 Mo. App. at 134.

2005]

AnticipatoryNuisance

A. Nuisance PerSe v. Nuisance PerAccidens: Applying the Correct
Standard
Similar to the way that a nuisance can be either public or private s a
nuisance also can be either per se or per accidens. 89 A nuisance per se, or at
law, "is a nuisance at all times and and [sic] under any circumstances,
regardless of location or surroundings."9
Courts over the years have
declared a number of activities to be nuisances per se-generally, those
activities that are immoral, extra hazardous, and violate state statutes are
nuisances per se. 91
A nuisance per accidens, or in fact, is an action, activity, or use of land
that becomes a nuisance because of the nature of the surrounding
circumstances.9 2 For example, there are numerous oil refineries and storage
facilities that line the northern stretch of the New Jersey Turnpike. These
facilities are not nuisances per se and are not considered nuisances per
accidens because they are located in industrial areas, near shipyards, ports,
other refineries, and factories. But, if the oil companies attempted to move
their refineries and storage facilities twenty miles south, to the "Jersey
Shore," there is little question that the landowners would file, and likely
prevail, in a suit to enjoin the refineries' new locations. In this example, the
refineries exemplify a nuisance per accidens. They are only a nuisance in
certain situations, and a determination of such instances is bound to be fact
intensive.

88. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
89. The Supreme Court of Tennessee noted the difference between these two types of nuisance
when it stated: "the difference between a nuisance per se, and a nuisance per accidens is that in the
former, injury in some form is certain to be inflicted, while in the latter, the injury is uncertain or
contingent until it actually occurs." Tennessee ex rel. Cunningham v. Feezell, 400 S.W.2d 716, 719
(Tenn. 1966) (citing Pierce v. Gibson County, 64 S.W. 33 (Tenn. 1901)); see also Viii. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,-ike a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.").
90. Harless v. Workman, 114 S.E.2d 548, 552 (W. Va. 1960); Sharp v. 25 1st St. Landfill, 810
P.2d 1270, 1276 n.6 (Okla. 1991), overruled on other grounds by DuLaney v. Okla. State Dep't of
Health, 868 P.2d 676, 683 (Okla. 1993); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 16 (2002); see also Sharp, supra
note 10, at 630 (defining nuisance per se as "an act that is a nuisance 'at all times and under any
circumstances"') (quoting Marshall v. Consumers' Power Co., 237 N.W.2d 266, 283 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975)).

See generally ROSALIND MALCOLM & JOHN POINTING, STATUTORY NUISANCE: LAW AND

PRACTICE (2002) (quoting the aim of the book "to provide a comprehensive and definitive account of
the various types of statutory nuisance [laws]" from the preface).
91. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW USE 47 (4th
ed. 1991).
92. Duff v. Morgantown Energy Assoc., 421 S.E.2d 253, 257-58 n.8 (W. Va. 1992).
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B. Inconsistent State Law Decisions: What Standardto Require?
Many courts, especially those at the state level, 93 have not acted on
anticipatory nuisance actions in a consistent manner. It has been theorized
that the inconsistency, particularly with respect to the level of proof
required of a plaintiff, is one reason anticipatory nuisance is underutilized.94 Not only is there inconsistency between the states, but also
within each state as judges decide anticipatory nuisance actions based on
the particular facts. 95 This Article will not focus extensively on the rather
limited federal case law.96 Rather, primary emphasis will be placed upon a
critical analysis of the treatment of this problem area by the state courts.
That said, the Article now evaluates the three discernible judicial trends
emerging from what may have been seen as a heavy fog of penumbras and
inconsistencies.
1. The Requirement of a Nuisance Per Se
The first apparent trend is that some courts will only consider the
anticipatory enjoining of an activity if that activity constitutes a nuisance
per se.97 In Wallace v. Andersonville Docks, Inc., the Tennessee Court of
Appeals heard an appeal of the trial court's decision to enjoin the operation
93. State courts hear the majority of nuisance and anticipatory nuisance actions. See Sharp,
supra note 10, at 632-45 (noting that federal courts have addressed anticipatory nuisance cases only
three times since 1900, and describing numerous instances where state courts have addressed the issue).
Further research has uncovered that, in fact, federal courts have dealt with this issue more than three
times. See, e.g., Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1960). The First
Circuit, although it set aside the verdict, noted that the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island found that a refinery, if operated, would pollute the air with noxious gases. Id. at 471.
94. Sharp, supra note 10, at 632-33.
95. Id. at 633. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that an activity can be enjoined only
"'upon a showing that the nuisance is inevitable from the proposed use or operation of the premises."'
State ex rel. Vill. of Los Rachos de Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque, 889 P.2d 185, 201 (N.M.
1994) (quoting 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.59.40, at 487 (3d
ed. 2003)). In this opinion, the court expressed, in a slightly more convoluted fashion, the rule in New
Mexico that an "anticipated nuisance must be proven so as to make any argument that it is not a
nuisance highly improbable." Id. at 200.
96. A perusal of the federal cases shows that the federal courts have developed a federal
common law of anticipatory nuisance and, in the rare instances when they are called on to resolve this
cause of action, have done so more consistently than state courts. See, e.g., Coosaw Mining Co. v.
South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 567 (1892) (upholding injunction prohibiting the mining of phosphate
from the Coosaw river). The three cases that are discussed at length in Sharp, supra note 10, at 633-36,
are Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248-49 (1901) (overruling defendant's demurrers to
complainant's bill while noting "that it is settled that an injunction to restrain a nuisance will issue only
in cases where the fact of nuisance is made out upon determinate and satisfactory evidence"); Texas v.
Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 237 (10th Cir. 1971) (enjoining the anticipated nuisance of spraying toxaphene, a
pesticide, without actually discussing the doctrine); and Cal. Tahoe Reg ' PlanningAgency v. Jennings,
594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (adopting the determinate and satisfactory standard).
97. Sharp, supra note 10, at 638 n.77.
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of a racetrack. 98 The plaintiffs argued that the operation of the racetrack
should not be permitted because of the loud noise that the motorcycles and
other racing machines would produce. 99 The appeals court reversed the trial
court and stated that "the thing complained of is a nuisance per accidens,
[not a nuisance per se] ... [and] such [a] nuisance will not be enjoined
anticipatory to its going into operation. ' °
Similarly, in Cherokee Hills Utility District v. Stanley, a Tennessee
Court of Appeals examined the plaintiff's claim that defendant's building
violated an implied restrictive covenant on the land.' 0 ' The court, applying
a de novo standard of review, first highlighted the Chancellor's finding that
Stanley's proposed use violated the express provision that defendant's lot
not be used in a way that "might or could create a nuisance." 10 2 The court
then undertook to examine the Chancellor's reasoning. First, the court
found that Stanley's white-water rafting business had not yet begun and that
there was no factual basis to determine whether, if commenced, it would
constitute a nuisance. 10 3 The court added "' [a] mere possibility or fear of
future injury from a... business which is not a nuisance per se is not
ground for injunction, and equity will not interfere where the apprehended
injury is doubtful or speculative.' ' ' 04 In even more restrictive language, it
stated: "[A]nticipatory nuisance will only be enjoined when the injury is
imminent and certain to occur. Injunctive relief will be granted only in
those cases where it is shown that the proposed establishment is a nuisance
1 05
per se."'

98. Wallace v. Andersonville Docks, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
99. Id. at 533-34. The court found that it is common knowledge that the motorcycles would
make "considerable" noise. Id.
100. Id. at 535.

101. Cherokee Hills Util. Dist. v. Stanley, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 9, 1989). In this complicated case, land went through numerous transactions before ending up in
defendant Stanley's ownership. Id. at *1-7. The land began as employee housing of the Tennessee
Copper Company where employees could buy a lot for $100 and the land was subject to a residential

only requirement. Id. at *1-2.
102. Id. at *6, *8-10. The Chancellor issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Stanley's
proposed use. Id. at *9-10.
103. Id. at *19.
104. Id. at *19 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (omission in original) (quoting State ex
rel. v. Feezell, 400 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tenn. 1966)).

105. Id at *20 (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v. Andersonville Docks Inc, 489 S.W.2d
532, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); see Fink v. Bd. of Trs., 218 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)

(holding that "a court of equity may enjoin a threatened or anticipated nuisance, where it clearly appears
that a nuisance will necessarily result from the contemplated act"); Koeber v. Apex-Albuq Phoenix
Express, 380 P.2d 14, 16 (N.M. 1963) (holding that the construction and operation of a truck terminal

was an enjoinable nuisance because it was "manifest" that it would necessarily become a nuisance);
Phillips v. Allingham, 33 P.2d 910, 915 (N.M. 1934) (holding that a gasoline storage site was not a
nuisance per se nor would necessarily result in one).
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2. Irreparable Injury
A second theme that some courts have utilized in deciding cases on this
issue is to consider carefully the gravity of the harm. These decisions focus
accordingly on whether the irreparable harm the plaintiff is contending will
occur. 10 6 This is true particularly in environmental pollution cases.'1 7 In
Sharp v. 251st Street Landfill Inc., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma heard a
case that nearby landowners brought to enjoin a proposed landfill. 10 8 The
plaintiffs did not argue, and the court did not find, that the landfill would be
a nuisance per se;' 0 9 rather, the residents argued that the site would pollute
the area's groundwater. l 0 After lengthy discussion of the site's safety, and
a battle of experts,"' the court held that an injunction was proper because
once groundwater is contaminated it is almost impossible to clean up.'12 In
reaching this decision, it undertook to "balance the equities."'' 3 In so
doing, the court found that the gravity of the potential harm, namely
outweighed the utility of the good,
irreparable groundwater contamination,
14
landfill."
sanitary
a
of
construction
the
3. The Dual Standard
A third approach that some courts have applied arises out of a dual
standard. Under the dual standard, these courts will enjoin activities that
are either nuisances per se or will necessarily become a nuisance." 5 Thus,
in Seidner v. Ralston Purina Co., the rule in Rhode Island was already
106. Sharp, supranote 10, at 638; Williams, supra note 15, at 241.
107. Williams, supra note 15, at 241.
108. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill Inc., 810 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Okla. 1991), overruled on other
grounds by Dulaney v. Okla. State Dep't of Health, 868 P.2d 676, 683 (Okla. 1993). The landowners
formed a group known as the Okmulgee County Toxic Waste Information Group Inc. to fight the
proposed landfill and the permits that the state issued allowing its construction. Id.
109. Id. at 1276 n.6 (stating that it is "generally accepted that sanitary landfills are not nuisances
per se") (citing Horn v. Cmty. Refuse Disposal, Inc., 180 N.W. 691, 693 (Neb. 1970)).
110. Id.at 1279.
111. Id.at 1279-80; see infra Part II.E.I.
112. Sharp, 810 P.2d at 1281.
113. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 62-67 (discussing the Restatement of Torts'
balancing of equities).
114. Sharp, 810 P.2d at 1281. The court stated:
We also believe the balance of equities here favors Appellees due to the
potential long-term effects contamination may have to their water sources and
granting the injunction was not adverse to the public interest. At most, Appellant
has a financial stake in constructing and operating its landfill. Although this
Court recognizes the need for landfills, this record does not conclusively indicate
a particular need for the involved one at the designated location.
Id.
115. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 640-41 (noting that New Mexico courts adhere to this dual
standard).
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established "'that where a proposed structure, or the use of it, is not a
nuisance per se,"' the court will not grant an injunction unless the alleged
nuisance will 'necessar[ily] result ....
It has been suggested that the
dual standard is in fact redundant because "nuisances per se are included
within the set of actions that would 'necessarily result' in a nuisance." '".7
C. Surveying Georgiaand Alabama: An Analysis of the Two States that
Have Anticipatory Nuisance Statutes
Currently, two states have statutory enactments that cover the issue of
anticipatory nuisance. Those two states, Georgia and Alabama, have nearly
identical statutory language but, as is generally the case with this cause of
action, courts have given each statute varying interpretations.
The
following section compares the judicial decisions that these two statutes
have brought about and will try to develop a template for resolving the
numerous problems the doctrine presents.
1. Georgia
Georgia Code section 41-2-4 states, "Where the consequence of a
nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable damage and
such consequence is not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain,
an injunction may be issued to restrain the nuisance before it is
completed.,, 18
Although Georgia case law on this topic is nonetheless relatively dated,
it is quite instructive. For example, in Powell v. Garmany, the defendant
appealed the trial court's granting of an injunction that restrained him from
building a dog and cat hospital on his property." 9 The plaintiffs, nearby
homeowners, claimed that the animal hospital would cause incessant noise
at all hours, would invite fleas, flies, as well as odors, and generally would
make "the plaintiff's property almost uninhabitable, and seriously interfere
with the comfort, peace, and quiet of her home and family."' 20 On appeal,
the court reversed the injunction and allowed the defendant to pursue his
116. Otto Seidner, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 24 A.2d 902, 909 (R.I. 1942) (quoting City of
Lynchburg v. Peter, 133 S.E. 674, 682 (Va. 1926)). The Lynchburg court added that it would not simply
enjoin a proposed activity because it may become a nuisance, rather it would "await the actual results."
Id.
117. Sharp, supranote 10, at 640.
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-4 (1991). See note 83, supra, for the contemporary legislative
response to this issue in England through implementation of The Environmental Protection Act of 1990.
119. Powell v. Garmany, 67 S.E.2d 781, 782 (Ga. 1951).
120. Id. The defendant's proposed hospital was to be located 400 feet to the south of plaintiffs
home and was to house a large number of sick animals. Id.
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venture. 12 1 In so doing, the court looked to the state statute and to prior case
law to find that the plaintiff's allegations of noise, odor, and the like were
merely "speculative and contingent conclusions of the pleader" and,
therefore, they did not provide grounds for relief because they did not meet
122
the statutory requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty.
Similarly, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Frazier,the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's refusal to enjoin construction of the defendant's bulk oil
and gas storage facility in a residential neighborhood. 23 The court stated
first that the vending and bulk storage of gasoline and oil did not, of itself,
constitute a nuisance. 124 After citing Powell and Elder, it stated that "'mere
apprehension of injury' is insufficient and that "it cannot be presumed in
that the [proposed] facility... will be
advance of its erection and operation
125
manner."'
improper
an
in
operated
In Isley v. Little, the residents of an area near a proposed drag-racing
strip brought suit to enjoin its construction due to loud noise, intoxicated
visitors, and various other problems that the track would bring to the
area.126 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the plaintiffs' averments
of excessive noise, 127 dust,' 28 and smells 129 were to a reasonable degree

certain and that, therefore, the plaintiffs' action for anticipatory injunction
could prevail.' 30 It held further that the drag strip would "continuously and
health and property and prevent the full
irreparably damage the petitioners'
' 31
properties."'
their
of
enjoyment
It appears that one of the major foundations underlying the rule that
there must be certainty before a court of equity will enjoin an alleged
121. Id. at 783.
122. Id. The court also cited prior case law in reaching its conclusion. The ruling stated that in
Georgia, "[a] court of equity will only ... restrain the erection of a building... on the ground that the
operation of such business will constitute a nuisance, where it is... reasonab[ly] certain[] that such
operation necessarily constitutes a nuisance, the consequences of which will be irreparable damages."

Id.; see also Elder v. City of Winder, 40 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 1946) (requiring a reasonable degree of
certainty to enjoin).
123. Chevron Oil Co. v. Frazier, 185 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Ga. 1971).
124. Id. at 380.
125. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Powell v. Garmany, 67 S.E.2d 781, 783 (Ga. 1951)).
126. Isley v. Little, 124 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Ga. 1962).
127. The court characterized the noise as follows: the cars will "create loud and damaging
noises by the roaring of motors; attain speeds of 90 to 150 miles per hour... crying of tires and
concomitant noises arising therefrom and the necessity of... stopping said vehicles,.., with the
stopping and starting operation causing the crying from spinning and skidding tires to be heard clearly a
distance of two miles." Id.
128. The plaintiffs also alleged that "clouds of dust and smoke" would emanate from the track.
Id.
129. With regard to odors, the complaint discussed the smell of burnt rubber and engine fires.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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nuisance is that the plaintiffs will have an adequate remedy at law even if
the contemplated use is begun.' 32 Courts in Georgia, when deciding an
anticipatory nuisance action, must look to the two-part test of the statute
and find both irreparable damage' 33 and a high degree of certainty that such
damage will occur before enjoining a proposed land use. This means that
there is less fact-sensitive balancing 134 than under the common law
difficult for a plaintiff to
approach and that, in reality, it is extraordinarily
135
suit.
nuisance
anticipatory
an
in
prevail
2. Alabama
The Alabama statute is strikingly similar to Georgia's. It states that,
"Where the consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced
will be irreparable in damages and such consequences are not merely
possible but to a reasonable degree certain, a court may interfere to arrest a
nuisance before it is completed. 1 36 As with the Georgia statute, the
language of the Alabama statute leaves large gaps open for interpretationsuch as what constitutes a reasonable degree of certainty and when will
damages be irreparable. 137 Alabama courts have attempted to answer these
questions but often have fallen prey to the same38 inconsistent approaches
that continue to hinder the common law doctrine.

132. Columbus v. Diaz-Verson, 373 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 1988). While this was not a true
anticipatory nuisance action, rather an action to block a building permit, the Supreme Court of Georgia
cited various anticipatory nuisance cases to support its decision to allow the permit. Id. at 209-10. The
court stated that because the plaintiffs had mere allegations of speculative injuries "with nothing to show
that they will in fact happen" the permit could be allowed. Id.at 210. The court was not concerned with
this result as it next noted "that the appellees have adequate remedies at law... for any future
damages." Id.
133. This is not to imply that irreparable injury is impossible to find. See, e.g., Camp v.
Warrington, 182 S.E.2d 419, 420 (Ga. 1971) (enjoining construction of an airport that would cause
planes to fly within 50-100 feet of plaintiffs' homes); Isley, 124 S.E.2d at 81 (holding that a petition
seeking to enjoin a drag strip based on nuisance as a cause of action could proceed).
134. See Camp, 182 S.E.2d at 420 (detailing the facts regarding the construction of an airport).
But see Isley, 124 S.E.2d at 81 (detailing the harms that construction of a drag strip would bring about
and balancing that against the plaintiffs' right to use their land).
135. It seems logical that there have been very few anticipatory nuisance cases in Georgia in the
last thirty years-this being in no small part due to the very difficult burden that the statute demands.
Plaintiffs have come to learn that they are unlikely to prevail in such a suit and instead they simply wait
until the building causes what they consider is an unreasonable interference with their land before filing
a suit.
136. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1975).
137. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 647 (discussing the fact that the statutory enactment offers no
clear guidelines or standards).
138. See id.at 646 (noting that "Alabama courts have disagreed as to the degree of certainty
required by the statute").
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a. Irreparable Damage
The first requirement of the Alabama statute that a plaintiff must
establish is that the proposed land use will cause irreparable damage. 39 In
the early case of Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, the Supreme Court of Alabama
denied a plaintiff an injunction, in part, because the damage to his property
that the alleged nuisance would cause was not sufficient. 40 The case
involved the construction of an iron ore plant and the washers that were
used to clean the ores. These washers caused sediment to flow downstream
and to accumulate on plaintiff's land and pollute the river abutting his
property. 141 In assessing the injury, the court adopted a balancing test,
when it held that, "[i]n determining [the injury], the court should weigh the
injury that may accrue to the one or the other party, and also to the public,
by granting or refusing the injunction.' 14 2
In a more recent case, the degree of injury again became an issue. In
Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, local residents filed suit to stop the construction
of a filling station. 143 The appellate court refused to enjoin the construction
even though the location would "work hurt" on "three hundred very
Rather, it found that the
expensive and highly restricted residences."'
decreases in property value were not "irreparable damages.' 4 5
It has been observed that "some Alabama courts interpret the state's
anticipatory nuisance statute to account for the extent of injury.' ' 146 This
implies, in turn, that Alabama courts should not look at the extent of the
injury when interpreting an anticipatory nuisance statute.1 47 The statute
demands that the extent of the injury be examined; for it, as Georgia's, is
really a two-part test-irreparable injury and a reasonable degree of
certainty.14 8 Consequently, the courts are required to examine the extent of
the injury to ascertain whether it will be irreparable.

139. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125.
140. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 6 So. 192, 193 (Ala. 1889).
141. Id. Although the court was clear that the plant did pollute the river, making it impossible to
use as drinking or bathing water, the court did not feel the injury was sufficient because the plaintiff had
other means of obtaining drinking water on his property. Id.
142. Id.
143. Shell Oil Co. v. Edwards, 81 So. 2d 535,537 (Ala. 1955).
144. Id. at 539. The proposed station, for which there did not appear to be a need, would be
located very close to these prestigious homes. Id.
145. See id. at 540-41.
146. Sharp, supra note 10, at 646. It has also been observed that "Alabama courts exhibit
inconsistency with respect to whether the Alabama statute requires a nuisance per se." Id. at 637.
147. See id. at 646-47.
148. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1975).
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b. Reasonable Degree of Certainty

The next step an Alabama court must take is to determine whether an
irreparable injury is reasonably certain to occur. A series of older Alabama
decisions summarize the general treatment of this issue. 149 In 1838, the
Alabama Supreme Court laid the groundwork for anticipatory nuisance in
the case of Rosser v. Randolph. 50 The case involved the proposed
construction of a sawmill. The plaintiff filed a bill to abate it as a nuisance,
but the court denied the bill, holding that the injury resulting from the
In yet another case
sawmill was uncertain and not irreparable. 15'
concerning the enjoinment of an anticipated nuisance, it was held that
"'there must be such a clear, precise statement of facts, that there can be no
reasonable doubt, if the acts threatened are completed, grievous injury will
result."" 52 Similarly, in Bellview Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, the Supreme
Court of Alabama refused to enjoin the construction of a cemetery because
the injury was "dubious" and "apprehended," as well as not proven.,53
More recently, most Alabama courts have continued to follow early
precedent in issuing anticipatory injunctions very sparingly.1 54 In one
instance, it was stated that "' [i]t is a general rule that an injunction will be
denied in advance of the creation of an alleged nuisance, when the act
complained of may or may not become a nuisance, according to
circumstances, or when' 55the injury apprehended is doubtful, contingent or
merely problematical." ",
Most recently, in 1989, the Alabama Supreme Court heard a case
where residential landowners sought to enjoin their neighbor from
constructing a lumber treatment facility that would use a tar-creosote
solution to treat the lumber.' 56 The plaintiffs alleged that the plant would
149. Sharp, supra note 10, at 646.
150. Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. 238 (Ala. 1838).
151. Id. at 244, 248. The court found that one option for the plaintiff to avoid having his spring
contaminated was to dig a ditch around it, therefore decreasing the likelihood of injury. Id.
152. Rouse v. Martin, 75 Ala. 510, 513 (1883) (quoting Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479
(1880)).
153. Bellview Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, 53 So. 272, 274 (Ala. 1910). The case involved the
proposed use of land as a cemetery and the proposed closing of a road. The court had trouble with the
fact that if this cemetery were enjoined simply because of the possibility of groundwater contamination,
then what type of slippery slope would they be starting down? Id. at 275.
154. Johnson v. Bryant, 350 So. 2d 433, 436 (Ala. 1977). Johnson involved a suit by beachfront
landowners to stop their neighbor from constructing a boat pier with a bathroom located on the end. Id.
at 434. The plaintiff's complained that the pier was a nuisance in that it extended into the navigable
channel and that the number of boats docked there created a sanitation risk. Id.
155. Parker v. City of Mountain Brook, 238 So. 2d 868, 873 (Ala. 1970) (quoting Brammer v.
Hous. Auth., 195 So. 256, 258 (Ala. 1940)). Parker involved a citizen's suit to enjoin the use and
operation of a dump heap and to stop construction of a municipal garbage facility. Id. at 868.
156. McCord v. Green, 555 So. 2d 743, 743-44 (Ala. 1989).
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render their homes uninhabitable and would cause them physical
discomfort, but the court rejected their complaint and refused the
injunction. 157 In so doing, the court acknowledged Section 6-5-125 of the
Alabama Code and the "extraordinary power[]" it gives. 58 Yet, it held that
anticipatory "injunctions should be denied unless the plaintiff shows to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the anticipated act or structure will, in
fact, constitute a nuisance."' 59
While the above cases at first glance appear consistent, and in reality
the decisions all deny injunctions, the real problem is that in reaching these
conclusions, the facts of each case control. A court can look simply at the
facts and determine if an injury is reasonably certain and therefore
deserving of an injncio
.Thi fact-sensitive approach does little bult
hinder the potential use of the anticipatory nuisance doctrine. Even though
statutes exist in both Georgia and Alabama, they are not thorough enough in
their terminology to resolve the inconsistent, fact-intensive, anticipatory
nuisance claims. For statutes such as Georgia's and Alabama's to aid in
consistent decisionmaking on this issue, the state legislatures would need to
define the standards in greater detail than the current "reasonable certainty"
standard. Any state that might consider enacting an anticipatory nuisance
statute must analyze carefully the problems with the common law doctrine
and try to resolve some of its inconsistencies through specific legislative
language. Additionally, because anticipatory nuisance is an equitable
doctrine, it is surprising that neither statute requires a balancing of the
public and the private interests. Without articulating a purpose for the
statutes, the judiciary-by default-is forced to create
and implement the
60
social policy behind the application of this doctrine.
D. AnticipatoryNuisance Actions to Obtain QualifiedInjunctions
A notable trend in the area of anticipatory nuisance is the use of a
qualified or partial injunction.16
A qualified injunction is a flexible
157. Id.at744,746.
158. Id.at745.
159. Id. Not all of the cases in Alabama have applied the same criteria. For example, in
Gilmore v. City of Monroeville, 384 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. 1980), the Supreme Court of Alabama, in a
decision contrary to over one hundred years of precedent, and one that was seemingly not followed,
stated that before they would enjoin the construction of a public works shop the plaintiffs had to show
that it would be a nuisance per se. Id.at 1081. Nowhere in the Alabama Code or prior case law does
this limitation on enjoining anticipatory nuisances appear except in this one anomalous case.
160. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 647 (observing that this situation "is inevitable because the
statutory language offers no clear standards or guidelines").
161. See Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (I11.
1981) (ordering the
defendant to exhume and move wastes deposited and enjoining the defendant's further use of the site in
such a manner); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974) (requiring compliance with
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solution that allows courts to take into account both the benefit to society of
the activity at issue as well as the severity of the potential harm by creating
an equitable remedy that "mandate[s] certain changes in... design or
A court can issue a
operation in order to... minimize the nuisance.''
qualified injunction contingent upon the defendant's actions, often requiring
63
the defendant to increase safety features or remedy a defect in planning.1
In Salter v. B. WS. Corporation,the court issued a qualified injunction
stopping the defendants from burying industrial waste 64 Although the
defendants were in compliance with applicable statutes, the court held that
the defendants could only bury the wastes according to a disposal scheme
that adhered to heightened safety standards endorsed by the expert
witnesses.165 In choosing this course the court considered, specifically and
appropriately, the negative 66consequences of a failure to contain these
poisonous industrial wastes. 1
The utility of a qualified injunction "is that it recognizes both the
potential severity of the prospective relief and the severe ramifications
of... environmental harm. 1 67 This intermediate approach also offers
significant flexibility in that "[i]t allows defendants the opportunity to
conform their plans with state of the art safety standards" and can require
68
defendants to do so despite the fact that their original plans were legal.
The benefit and advantage of qualified injunctions is that "anticipatory
nuisance actions do not have to stifle industrial growth in order to ensure
necessary public health safeguards.' 69

specific standards in lieu of enjoining complete operations); Cardwell v. Austin, 168 S.W. 385, 387
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (agreeing with the lower court that an injunction against construction and
operation of the tank was appropriate, but refusing to permanently enjoin the construction of a more
properly sized tank); see also Smith, supra note 1, at 703 ("A discernible trend in contemporary case
law... [is the] partial or experimental injunction . .
162. Smith, supra note 1, at 703.
163. See, e.g., Cardwell, 168 S.W. at 387 (suggesting that a septic concentration tank be of
proper dimension and construction so as to not give off foul odors or create a nuisance).
164. Salter, 290 So. 2d at 824, 825.
165. Id.at 821, 823. The defendant originally planned to bury the industrial waste in trenches
that would be covered with ten feet of clay. Id.The Louisiana court held that the disposal site could be
operated safely if the defendant lined the trenches with impermeable material, as recommended by the
defendant's own experts. Id. at 824-25.
166. Id.at 825.
167. Sharp, supra note 10, at 650.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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E. Problems with the CurrentState of the Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine
1. Battle of the Experts
The plaintiffs high burden of proof, in conjunction with the general
judicial skepticism regarding any anticipatory nuisance case that is
maintained, is almost bound to end up embroiled in a battle of experts. This
is a topic that few commentators have discussed at length, but one that has
come up in case law. Anticipatory nuisance cases are generally brought
against proposed industry, and usually against large-scale operations such
as rNIl rpfirnenes, landifillv triilmny fterminnlc nn the- l;ie It ;C thi.rai
anticipatory nuisance case that is a private nuisance action. With that being
the case, at trial a battle often occurs that pits the defendant's expert against
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs expert obviously tries to establish to a high
degree of likelihood that the proposed activity will constitute a nuisance and
the defendant's expert attempts to refute this evidence. 170 In essence, what
this confrontation does is make
land use activities a battle over who can get
1 71
the more compelling expert.
For instance, in Commerce Oil Refining Corp., v. Miner, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sifted through the expert
testimony of multiple witnesses.172 The court tried to decipher the expert
testimony regarding sulfur particles being emitted from smoke stacks and
causing harm to nearby property owners. 73 Ultimately it determined that it
would not enjoin the proposed refinery because the "relatively even balance
of the sharply conflicting expert testimony" led the court to take a wait-andsee approach. 74 Although they did not appear to like the decision, the
Seidner precedent forced this conclusion on the court. 77 The Seidner court,
although it found that coal dust might escape into the plaintiffs mayonnaise

170.

In Otto Seidner, Inc. v. Raltson Purina Co., 24 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1942), the plaintiff, an

operator of a mayonnaise factory, sued to enjoin the defendant's use of adjacent property as a coalloading depot where coal would be loaded into freight trains. Id. at 903. The plaintiffs expert, a long-

time coal industry employee, testified that the dust would get into the mayonnaise factory thereby
ruining the product. Id. at 907. The defendant's expert testified that tarps would prevent most of the
dust from escaping and floating the seventy-five feet into plaintiff's plant. Id. at 906.
171. In addition, this battle also results in lengthy and often expensive litigation, including
depositions of, and fees paid to, technical experts. See, e.g., Commerce Oil Ref. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465,

466 (1st Cir. 1960) (noting that the forty-day trial produced thousands of pages of testimony, much of
which was highly technical).
172. Id. at472.
173. Id. at471.
174. Id. at 475.
175. See id. (stating that the court felt "constrained to hold that the court below erred in
enjoining erection of the plaintiffs refinery as a prospective nuisance").
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factory, refused to enjoin prospectively the defendant's coal loading
operation. 76 It stated that although the dust would cause the plaintiffs
business increased costs, a "dilemma where it could not hope successfully
to cope with competition,"
it nonetheless refused to enjoin the coal business
77
prospectively.
As these two cases indicate, a battle of experts may indeed be futile
considering the presumption that the defendant carries. By engaging in
such a battle, even if the expert testimony is even or favors the plaintiff
slightly, a court is not likely to enjoin an activity prospectively. 78 What
can be done to resolve this problem is a more difficult question, as will be
seen in the next section. Anticipatory nuisance offers numerous advantages
and should be used more frequently than it is presently used. In order to
accomplish this goal, however, the courts will have to adopt a standard that
makes it easier for a plaintiff to prevail, especially when, as in Seidner, the
plaintiff brings forward compelling expert testimony.
2. Under-Utilization of the Doctrine Leads to Economic Waste
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance has been scorned because it has
the potential to prevent economic growth through the premature cessation
of a potential industry. 179 While this argument has merit, there is an oftignored benefit that anticipatory nuisance can offer; namely, the prevention
of economic waste. Under nuisance law, an unreasonable use of land can
be enjoined so as to stop the damage that the use is causing.1 80 The
problem, and one that has long troubled courts, is that often many millions
of dollars in investment and employment are tied up in industries that
become a nuisance and must be closed.18' Courts presented with this
problem try not to throw all of that investment away by enjoining an

176. Otto Seidner, Inc. v. Raltson Purina Co., 24 A.2d 902, 907 (R.I. 1942).
177. Id. at 907. From an economic point of view, this decision is baffling. The court was
willing to risk closing one profitable industry in order to allow another unproven industry to begin.
From an economic efficiency point of view this seems bizarre. The only possible explanation may lie in
the year of the decision, 1942, when coal might have been considered a better industry than foodproduct manufacturing, especially in light of war-time production schedules.
178. See id (refusing to grant a prospective injunction after hearing conflicting expert
testimony).
179. See supranotes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing the disdain for the doctrine).
180. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (enjoining a
pulp mill that injured the rights of a lower riparian land owner); see also Smith, supra note 1, at 696
n.262 (defining the doctrine of waste).
181. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d. 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970); see also Whalen,
101 N.E. at 806. The court stated that "[o]ne of the troublesome phases of this kind of litigation is the
difficulty of deciding when an injunction shall issue.., where the... actual injury.., will be small as
compared with the great loss which will be caused by the issuance of the injunction." Id. at 805-06.
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industry, but at times they must, and have.18 2 The anticipatory nuisance
doctrine can help resolve this dilemma.
A plaintiff brings an anticipatory nuisance action before a
contemplated use commences. This allows a court to look carefully at the
proposed use and determine whether it will become a nuisance, and, if so,
the court can enjoin the construction of the facility or the proposed use
before large amounts of money are expended on the project.'83 If an
anticipatory action is not brought or is rejected by the courts, and the
defendant spends millions of dollars on a project, there is some likelihood
that the enterprise will be closed and millions of dollars will have been
wasted.184 If courts or legislatures could reach a more consistent solution to
th
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economic waste could largely be eliminated.
III. THE RYAN BALANCING TEST
The best example of how courts can apply the anticipatory nuisance
doctrine with some degree of consistency is found in Village of Wilsonville
v. SCA Services, Inc. 185 Residents of Wilsonville brought a nuisance action
to enjoin the operation of a hazardous waste landfill.186 The proposed
location of the landfill was over an abandoned coal mine site adjacent to the
village. 87 The proposed landfill received approval by the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, which issued a license and permitted the
disposal of toxic waste.188 The landfill was designed8 9to have a clay liner to
prevent spillage and contamination of ground water.'
182. See, e.g., Whalen, 101 N.E. at 805-06.
183. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 630 (providing a cursory look at this problem).
184. Whalen, 101 N.E. at 806. In Whalen, the New York Court of Appeals upheld an injunction
that ordered a pulp mill to close because it spilled effluents into a nearby creek, thereby injuring
downstream landowners. Id. at 806. The reality of the situation was that the plant, which was built
shortly before 1910, cost over one million dollars and employed between 400-500 men. Id.at 805. But
see Madison v. Ducktown Sulpher, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904) (refusing to
issue an injunction that would have closed down the area's most important industry even though the
smoke and gases clearly constituted a nuisance). See also York v. Stallings, 341 P.2d 529 (Or. 1959).
The York court rejected that hard and fast rule that an injunction must issue when a use of land is
unreasonable. Instead, the Supreme Court of Oregon followed the lead of other courts in adopting the
Restatement of Torts Section 941 and balanced the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if
the injunction was granted and to the plaintiff if it was denied. Id.at 534.
185. Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (I11.
1981).
186. Id.at 826-27. Compare with the facts in Village of Goodfleld, where the proposed wastepit/landfill was to contain only non-hazardous hog waste. Vill. of Goodfield v. Jamison, 544 N.E.2d
1229, 1230 (111.1980).
187. Vill. of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 827.
188. Id. at 828. A new permit would have to be issued each time the landfill would receive
additional toxic waste. Id.
189. Id.at 827.
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The plaintiffs argued that there was a substantial risk to the residents of
Wilsonville. Evidence demonstrated that exposure to toxic waste would
In addition to
cause brain damage, cancer, and birth defects.'9
contaminating groundwater, the plaintiffs argued that the proposed storage
of toxic waste was a danger to the community-incompatible toxic
chemicals stored side by side in the landfill could result in an explosion.' 9'
An explosion would certainly emit toxic fumes into the air and threaten the
health of Wilsonville Village. 192 The Illinois Supreme Court granted
injunctive relief finding there was a high probability that operating a toxic
and necessarily result in substantial
waste landfill would create a nuisance
193
Wilsonville.
of
residents
the
to
injury
While concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Howard C. Ryan
stated that the court established too high a threshold for a plaintiff to
overcome. He suggested that by lowering the standard, the public at large
would not be subjected to activity that necessarily results in irreparable
harm. 194 He argued that the balancing test should weigh both the
probability and magnitude of an injury.' 9' If the harm that may result is
severe, a lesser possibility of its occurring should be required to support
injunctive relief. The Ryan balancing test recognizes that it is easy to
determine whether an activity will produce harm. The challenge often in
anticipatory nuisance cases is determining when catastrophic harm will
occur. The Ryan balancing test also will not permit fear or speculation to
be a controlling factor. Rather than requiring a plaintiff to establish that
there is a high probability of harm, the Ryan test focuses on whether there is
a reasonable connection between the proposed act and the disputed harm.
Conversely, if the potential harm is less severe, the plaintiff will have to
justifiably overcome a heightened196level of scrutiny that there is a high
probability of sustaining an injury.

190. Id. at 828.
191. Id. at 829-30.
192. Id. at 830.
193. Id. at 836-37, 841.
194. Id. at 842 (Ryan, J., concurring).
195. Id. Justice Ryan proposed an inverse balancing test---as the magnitude of the harm
increases, the lesser the probability required for an injunction to issue. Id
196. Id. This position has shadings of the doctrine of comparative nuisance where the focus is
placed on the extent of the responsibility of the parties, not the utility of their actions-this, in an effort
to determine the ultimate entitlement for the plaintiff and the defendant. See generally Jeff L. Lewin,
Comparative Nusiance, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1009 (1989) (comprehensively discussing the doctrine of
comparative nuisance).
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IV. MERGING LAW AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Economics affects virtually every decision in one's life. 197 The law
and those who practice the discipline are not immune from the "power" that
economics has in decisionmaking. In 1970, along with the Boomer
decision, the law and economics "movement" began. 198 Prior to 1970,
economic principles were being applied to traditional economic practice
areas such as antitrust, corporations, securities, and taxation.199 The law
and economics movement originated when economic principles were being
tested on subjects not analyzed previously in economic terms, such as the
law of torts. "[T]he hallmark of the 'new' law and economics-the law and
A
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economics to the legal system across the board . ... ,,200 The law and
economics movement attempted to apply neo-classical economics to a legal
conflict-arguing that legal disputes regarding property could be resolved
through economic efficiency. 20 1 Nuisance law after the Boomer decision,
and the law and economics movement itself, "rejects the traditional
emphasis on injunctive relief, asserting that this remedy often impedes the
efficient resolution of land use conflicts." 20 2 Many scholars in the law and
economics movement favor compensatory damages without injunctive
relief as an economically efficient remedy.20 3 There are an equal number of
scholars in the law and economics movement who contend that injunctive
relief, in one form or another, is an economically efficient remedial
device.2 °4 It should be understood that economic analysis is designed to
complement legal analysis, not act as a substitute. 20 5 Thus, achieving
economic efficiency in any legal issue will require balancing. 206
197. See The Use and Abuse of Economics, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 1995, at 17. ("For all its
imperfections, economics has turned itself into the superpower of the social sciences, one that exercises
a powerful influence on the lives of ordinarypeople.") (emphasis added).
198. Herbert Hovenkamp, The First GreatLaw & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993,
994 (1990).
199. Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54
ALB. L. REV. 189, 236 (1990) [hereinafter Lewin, Boomer andthe American Law of Nuisance].
200. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 (4th ed. 1992).
201. See generally id. at 21-27. But see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 1 (1986) ("The critical legal studies movement has undermined the central ideas of
modem legal thought and put another conception of law in their place. This conception implies a view
of society and informs a practice of politics.").
202. Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 775, 776 (1986) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Lewin, Compensated Injunctions].
203. See id at 776 (asserting that "[mlonetary damage compensation, not injunctive relief, is the
preferred remedy of most recent commentators").
204. See, e.g., id. at 776 n.7.
205. Jonathan R. Macey, The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis on Legal
Decisionmaking, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 108 (1994).
206. The balancing test used in the determination of whether an injunction will be granted is
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A. The Coase Theorem
The law and economics movement originated with the writing of
Ronald Coase. 20 7 The Coase Theorem reduces balancing to a level of
208
Coase contends in The Problem of Social
bargaining between interests.
Cost that parties will bargain freely to resolve legal disputes based on
economic efficiency. 20 9 The Coase Theorem, however, does not follow the
idea that economics should compliment law-rather economics is the
law.210 According to Coase, parties in a nuisance dispute will always
undertake to resolve such a conflict in the most economically efficient way
possible.2 ' In other words, when there is a conflict between parties, each
side is willing to do whatever is required economically in order to satisfy
their objective. The following describes how the Coase Theorem would
operate in a set of facts similar to Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.:
Suppose that Boomer suffers $2000 harm from the pollution. If
Atlantic is liable for damage to Boomer, Atlantic won't pollute
unless it profits from the pollution to the tune of $2000 or more.
If its profits are any lower, it will actually lose money by
polluting after it pays damages to Boomer. But if the profits are
higher than $2000, Atlantic will choose to pollute, pay damages,
and still come out ahead.
...

Suppose there is no tort liability, and that Atlantic's profits

are less than Boomer's $2000 in damages. At first blush it looks
like Atlantic will choose to pollute and make its profit, even
though a complete cost-benefit analysis would come out
negative. After all, what does Atlantic care about Boomer's harm
if it doesn't have to pay damages?... [I]f Atlantic's profits are
$1000 and Boomer's harm is $2000, Boomer could offer Atlantic
$1500 not to pollute. This is a winning deal for both sides-each
212
is $500 better off than in the situation where Atlantic pollutes.
Under the Coase Theorem, a "winning deal" may be struck at the
expense of the environment. In a post-Boomer world where pollution can
cause irreparable harm to the environment, economically efficient solutions
similar to the balancing test used in the determination of whether a nuisance will be established. See
Smith, supra note 1. See generally Lewin, CompensatedInjunctions,supra note 202, at 775.
207. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
208. D.A.F., The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 141, 142
(1996).
209. Coase, supra note 207, at 1.
210. See D.A.F., supra note 208, at 142 ("Bargaining washes away legal rules .
.
211. Coase, supra note 207.
212. D.A.F., supra note 208, at 141-42.
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without legal analysis and balancing will produce disastrous results. The
long-term results of a Coasean solution, without the benefit of legal
reasoning, would be economically inefficient if a nuisance activity were to
produce high environmental clean-up costs.
B. The Calabresiand Melamed Analysis
Judge Guido Calabresi, following the Coase Theorem, argues that
unconditional injunctive relief might be inefficient, provided each party was
charged with the full costs of the damages it caused to others.213 Calabresi
does not completely rule out nuisance injunctions as such, stating that a
balance of costs 214
and benefits is required to prevent economically inefficient
injunctive relief.
The law and economics movement received a major push in 1972 from
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. 2 15 The significance of the
Calabresi and Melamed analysis is its recognition that economics must
complement the law of torts. When determining whether a nuisance exists
under Calabresi and Melamed's law and economic analysis, two issues
must be addressed: who has an "entitlement" and what "remedy" is given to
the party with the entitlement.21 6 Entitlement determines "which of the
conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail. 217 Applying the facts of
Boomer, for example, in a nuisance lawsuit between a polluting factory and
its neighbors, "the law must either grant [the Atlantic Cement Company]' an
218
entitlement to pollute or grant [Mr. Boomer] an entitlement to clean air.
After the court has made a finding of law assigning an entitlement, a
remedy must be given to protect that entitlement.21 9
Calabresi and Melamed divide the allocation of remedies into three
categories--"property rules," "liability rules," and "inalienability rules." 220
213. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 534-40 (1961) (discussing resource allocation in the context of nuisance cases).
214. Id. at 534-36. For example, injunctive relief would be efficient if damages were dispersed
widely and one party or enterprise is not liable for all the damage caused. Lewin, Boomer and the
American Law ofNuisance, supra note 199, at 242.
215. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (announcing an approach that
integrates law and economics through "a concept of 'entitlements').
216. Id. at 1090, 1092.
at 1090.
217. Id.
218. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance, supra note 199, at 245; see also
Lewin, Compensated Injunctions, supra note 202, at 788.
219. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 215, at 1092.
220. Id. In the third remedial category Calabresi and Melamed identify "rules of inalienability."
Id. at 1111. The authors decided to discuss inalienability rules separately from property and liability
rules as the latter are linked in their application to the law of torts. Id. at 1106; see also Lewin, Boomer
and the American Law of Nuisance,supra note 199, at 245-246 (describing Calabresi and Melamed's
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Accordingly, if Mr. Boomer is protected by a property rule entitlement to
clean air, an injunction against the Atlantic Cement Company can be
obtained.2 2' If Mr. Boomer is protected by a liability rule entitlement to
clean air, Atlantic Cement Company may continue its operation, but the
plaintiff can obtain compensatory damages.22 2
The liability rule is an "empty" entitlement similar to the Boomer
scenario discussed in the Coase Theorem. 23 For example, Atlantic Cement
Company was found liable of creating a nuisance and had to pay damages.
Mr. Boomer was awarded an empty entitlement because the Atlantic
Cement Co. continues to pollute Mr. Boomer's property and make a
profit.224 The Calabresi and Melamed liability rule allows a tortfeasor to
destroy a plaintiff's entitlement to clean air simply by paying a reasonable
amount in damages. 225 The plaintiff's entitlement, his right, is being
withheld because economics prevails over legal reasoning or "justice." In a
post-Boomer world, the liability rule would permit defendants to pollute the
environment and cause potentially irreparable damage. Calabresi and
Melamed suggest that damages should be calculated based on an
"objectively determined value. 226 The dilemma in awarding damages is
how one quantifies an irreversible and permanent loss to the environment.
Having defined the entitlement and remedy components, Calabresi and
Melamed identify four possible outcomes when resolving a nuisance
dispute: (1) no nuisance is found; 227 (2) plaintiff enjoins defendant's
229
nuisance; 228 (3) plaintiff obtains compensatory damages from defendant;
or (4) plaintiff enjoins defendant's nuisance but must pay for the abated
activity through compensated injunction.230
distinction between the two types of rules). It has been suggested that property and liability rules
regarding nuisance lie on a continuum. "[U]nder property rules, a person's entitlement is guaranteed,
whereas under the liability rule, the injurer is permitted to harm the victim so long as he pays damages
equal to harm." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus LiabilityRules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REv. 713, 756 (1996).
221. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 220, at 756.
222. Id.
223. See Coase, supra note 207, at I ("The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from
which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties.").
224. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Coase Theorem in context with Boomer).
225. See Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 215, at 1092.
226. Id
227. See id.at 1115-16 (noting a total victory for the defendant); see also Lewin, Compensated
Injunctions, supra note 202, at 789 (noting that the defendant has an entitlement to pollute "and is, in
effect, protected by a property rule: the defendant has the right to continue the offending activity and
cannot be compelled to relinquish that right except in a voluntary transaction").
228. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 215, at 1115-16 (indicating a total victory for the
plaintiffand that the plaintiff has an entitlement to clean air and is protected by a property rule).
229. See id.(noting a partial victory for the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has an entitlement to
clean air, but is protected by a liability rule).
230. Id This last outcome would result in a partial victory for the defendant. See Spur Indus.,
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The Calabresi and Melamed analysis appropriately recognizes that
resolving nuisance actions in a post-Boomer world must contain both
"entitlement" and "remedy" components. With the exception of granting an
entitlement, which is protected by a liability rule, each possible outcome
has merit in a post-Boomer world. As observed previously, when there is a
threat of irreparable harm to the environment, permitting a tortfeasor to
continue polluting is unreasonable and economically inefficient. Whenever
nuisance activity may have a serious effect on the environment, the balance
should be in favor of environmental protection using injunctive relief.
C. To Enjoin orNot To Enjoin, That Is the Question
Building on the law and economics foundation established by Coase
and Calabresi and Melamed, Robert Ellickson and Edward Rabin have
presented the idea that "unconditional" injunctive relief in nuisance cases
should be eliminated completely. 231 Ellickson and Rabin contended that a
victim's remedy options should be limited to compensatory damages and
conditional injunctions.23 2 Although Ellickson and Rabin reached the same
conclusion, their analytical approaches were slightly different. Both
approaches were rooted, however, in principles of economic efficiency,
fairness, and balancing.
Ellickson states that the use of injunctive relief is economically
inefficient where a defendant's cost to abate nuisance activity exceeds the
damages inflicted on the plaintiff.233 Efficient use of resources requires
minimizing the sum of nuisance costs and assigning the liability to the
least-cost-avoider of a conflict. 234 Limiting a plaintiff's remedy options,
Ellickson contends, would reduce the need by courts to balance the facts,
235
which often creates inconsistency and uncertainty.
In many instances courts avoided finding actionable
nuisances by applying a type of balancing test; the social utility
Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (enjoing a cattle ranch from operating, but
ordering the plaintiff to pay damages).
231. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 685 (1973) ("One option for handling [nuisances] is to
adopt a laissez faire [approach] .... and rely entirely upon informal social [as well as economic] forces
rather than governmental action to control land use decisions."); see also Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law:
Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1977) (proposing "that the
prevailing judicial response to nuisance problems, a response that heavily utilizes unconditional
injunctions, is too inflexible" and that conditional injunctions should be used instead).
232. Ellickson, supra note 231, at 738; Rabin, supra note 231, at 1347.
233. Ellickson, supra note 231, at 720.
234. Id. at 724.
235. Id. at 739.
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of the actor's conduct was compared to the total amount of harm
caused. This test is proper for deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief. Unfortunately most courts applied the test to
the initial question of whether a nuisance existed at all,
incorrectly limiting the availability of
236damage awards that would
internalize the harmful externalities.

Edward Rabin attempts to bring the balancing test into the awarding of
damages, as well as applying it to the finding of nuisance. 237 Rabin's
balancing test for awarding damages pursues the joint goals of fairness and
efficiency. 238 Achieving fairness and efficiency in economic terms means
ultimately that a plaintiff will not be able to obtain both damages and
injunctive relief in every nuisance lawsuit. For example, if the plaintiff
prevails in his nuisance action, the defendant has the option of abating the
activity when it is in his economic best interest. Consequently, abating a
nuisance is only efficient for the defendant when the cost of abatement is
less than paying damages.
Rabin also contends that compensated injunctions are economically
efficient remedies, particularly for non-prevailing plaintiffs. 239
The
compensated injunction, according to Rabin, provides some relief to the
plaintiff in that he does not have to undergo lengthy negotiations with a
tortfeasor to abate a nuisance. Compensated injunctions force the defendant
to abate, thus "reduc[ing] the transaction costs of strategic behavior during
negotiations because both sides would be aware that the plaintiff could
resort to the judicial remedy whenever the defendant tried to hold out for an
unreasonably high price." 240

The law and economics position against

injunctive relief has some merit in that it eliminates inefficient
unconditional injunctions and reduces the amount of wasteful transaction
costs incurred through abatement negotiations.

236. Id.at 720-21 (footnote omitted).
237. Rabin, supra note 231, at 1309. A balancing of the gravity of the harm against the utility of
good is performed when determining whether a nuisance exists. See supra notes 2, 60-68 and

accompanying text.
238. See id. at 1309. "The first step would be to determine who is morally more blameworthy
for the existence of the conflict.... The second step in the proposed procedure would be to determine

how the conflict can be resolved with least expense." Id.
239.

Id.at 1343. Although the use of compensated injunctions could theoretically be applied to

plaintiffs prevailing in a nuisance action, Rabin limits his consideration of the remedy to non-prevailing
plaintiffs. Id.; see also Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance, supra note 199, at 256
(noting that compensated injunctions would be possible in a prevailing plaintiff scenario when there is

dissatisfaction with the amount of court-awarded compensatory damages).
240. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions, supra note 202, at 801 (emphasis added); Rabin, supra
note 23 1, at 1344-45.
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Conversely, denying injunctive relief often leads to undercompensatory damages. 24' A. Mitchell Polinsky and Gregory Travalio have
been critical of the no-injunctive-relief theory posited by Coase, Calabresi
and Melamed, as well as Ellickson and Rabin. Polinsky asserts that a
balancing test can be applied to the granting of injunctive relief.242 For
example, through balancing the gravity of the harm against the utility of the
good, a form of "cooperative bargaining" could produce an equitable and
efficient use of injunctive relief.243 Cooperative bargaining can be
considered an intermediate level of granting injunctive relief between
permanent injunction and no injunction. A plaintiff would be entitled to
reasonably clean air and the defendant would be entitled to pollute
nprti ylh,
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Atlantr (Cment
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h

allowed to pollute up to a certain amount of dust, and Mr. Boomer would be
enjoyment of his property, "free of any pollution in
allowed the reasonable
244
excess of that limit."
In a post-Boomer world, such a compromise on injunctive relief may
produce effective and efficient results in which each party has obtained a
remedy that can be tolerated. Mr. Boomer will have to endure some
pollution, reserving the right to abate any interference in the enjoyment of
his property that causes a greater environmental annoyance. In addition,
Atlantic Cement Company will have to reduce its cement producing
operation, reserving the right to an increase in pollution if the nuisance
complaint is unreasonable. In the event that reduced pollution continues to
create an unreasonable interference or that reduced productivity produces
unprofitability, either party will have the opportunity to seek compensatory
damages or compensated injunction, respectively. Environmental impact
studies would be beneficial in a cooperative bargaining approach in that
such reports determine how much pollution the environment could naturally
"tolerate" without creating irreparable damage.

241. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075, 1110-11 (1980); see also Gregory Travalio, Pay Up or
Shut Down: Some CautionaryRemarks on the Use of Conditional Entitlements in Private Nuisance
Cases, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1986) (questioning the superiority of the damage remedy and
the conditional injunction in nuisance cases).
242. Polinsky, supra note 241, at 1112. But see Ellickson, supra note 231, at 738-39
(advocating the application of a balancing test for the granting of compensatory damages and
compensated injunctions).
243. Polinsky, supra note 241, at 1087.
244. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance,supra note 199, at 259.
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V. ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE IN THE POST-BOOMER WORLD

The use of anticipatory nuisances has an important role to play in a
post-Boomer world. Applying the Ryan balancing test in Wilsonville to
anticipatory nuisance cases will provide the most flexibility and fairness to
both parties in that a plaintiff must prove that a proposed activity will
necessarily result in an injury. However, the necessary-result application
under the Ryan construct does not require the plaintiff to establish that there
is a high probability that such activity will exist if there is no injunctive
relief.
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance is very inconsistent and
unpredictable. Pinpointing the outcome of an anticipatory nuisance action
in the post-Boomer world is highly speculative. At first glance, creating a
predictable and consistent application of the doctrine would be logical.
However, any attempt at restricting a court's fluidity and flexibility in
anticipatory nuisance cases is contrary to the entire balancing concept. In
order for fairness and reasonableness to prevail, predictability and
consistency must be sacrificed.
The use of law and economics in anticipatory nuisance cases should
complement rather than compete with each other. By balancing each
principle equally, victims and tortfeasors are somewhat "guaranteed" that
their interests will be protected. With the exception of protecting liability
rule entitlements, as suggested by Coase, Calabresi and Melamed, a court
should entertain every possible remedy option-including injunctive relief.
Unconditional injunctive relief is economically inefficient in a post-Boomer
world. For example, if a permanent injunction were to have been granted in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company, some three hundred jobs would have
been terminated by the company.2 4' Furthermore, the company itself would
have had to liquidate. The forty-five million dollars invested in the cement
plant would have been forfeited as well. 246 Obviously, the greater-Albany
community would have been placed under economic stress if the plant had
closed.
In a post-Boomer world where pollution is more substantial than rather
simple dust and intermittent noise, enjoining activity that may produce
Because there are more
irreparable harm cannot be overlooked.
opportunities to create such irreversible environmental damage, anticipatory
245. Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
246. Id. In an interesting environmentally conscious dissent, Justice Matthew J. Jasen
disavowed the majority's use of assessing permanent damages in lieu of an injunction and urged the
company be enjoined from continuing to discharge dust particles unless, within an eighteen-month
period, it were to be successful in abating the nuisance to the plaintiffs. Id. at 877 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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nuisance, applied with both law and economic principles, is needed now
more than ever.
VI. THE FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE ANTICIPATORY
NUISANCE DOCTRINE

Federal courts, unlike state courts, have established a relatively
consistent federal common law to address anticipatory nuisance. In Mugler
v. Kansas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court of equity could act
prospectively to provide a more complete and appropriate remedy (e.g.,
injunctive relief) than was available at law.247 The same Court said that
only through prospective injunction could the Court protect future public
interests.248 Since 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the
anticipatory nuisance issue only once.249 In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri
sought to enjoin Illinois from building a sewage channel that would empty
1,500 tons of untreated sewage a day into tributaries of the Mississippi
River. 250 The court held "that damage and irreparable injury will naturally
and necessarily be occasioned by [these] acts."2 5' It went on to establish a
"determinate and satisfactory evidence" test to determine if a prospective
nuisance could be enjoined, and required that the facts must show "real and
immediate" danger.25 2 It then concluded that, if the defendant's acts would
naturally and necessarily cause damage and irreparable injury, a prospective
injunction is an appropriate remedy.253
In Texas v. Pankey, the Tenth Circuit addressed another environmental
anticipatory nuisance action.254 Here, the court recognized that a federal
common law nuisance action could enjoin a threatened use of a pesticide on
lands that drained into a river flowing into Texas. 255 However, by the time
the Tenth Circuit's opinion was issued, actual spraying had occurred and, to
avoid the mootness issue, the court characterized the action as one to enjoin
further spraying. 56

247. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887). This was the first time that a federal court
had recognized the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance. Id.
248. Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 567 (1892).
249. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). Two circuit courts did address this issue: Cal.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979); and Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236 (10th Cir. 1971).
250. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 209, 213.
251. Id. at 248.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 236.
255. Id. at 238, 240.
256. Id.at 240, 242.
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One of the few other federal courts to address the anticipatory nuisance
issue was the Ninth Circuit in California Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency
v. Jennings.z25 In Jennings, California sought to enjoin the construction of
four hotel-casinos claiming that the added vehicle and human traffic would
258
create a nuisance and "harm the environment of the region.,
Distinguishing Jennings from Missouri v. Illinois and Pankey, the Ninth
Circuit disregarded California's claim that the high-rise hotels would harm
the environment and refused to equate high-rise hotels with the untreated
sewage, noxious gases, and poisonous pesticides present in Missouri v.
Illinois and Pankey.259 The court, perhaps responding to the more certain
environmental consequences of the previous federal anticipatory nuisance
cases, stated that, in Jennings, there was not the direct and immediate
connection between the controversial activity and the harm caused that had
existed in Missouri v. Illinois and Pankey.26 ° Applying the "determinate
and satisfactory evidence" test, the court found that California had failed to
establish that the danger of nuisance was "real and immediate," but the
court did affirm the anticipatory nuisance doctrine.2 6
While this precedent is not well established, it does imply that a federal
anticipatory nuisance claim can succeed by showing that a nuisance will
"necessarily" result from an activity and is thereby "real and immediate. 262
More importantly, the federal cases do not require that the nuisance meet
the per se standard that many states employ that263effectively eliminates the
equitable remedy of prospective injunctive relief.

257. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 181 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802 (1981) (granting injunctive relief as an equitable
remedy to enjoin a sewage treatment plant). But cf Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465,
475 (1st Cir. 1960) (denying injunction for the operation of a refinery, even in the face of conflicting
expert testimony, and adopting a wait-and-see approach).
258. Jennings, 594 F.2d at 184, 194. Jennings represents several cases that were combined for
appeal. Id at 184.
259. Id. at 194.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 193-94.
262. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901).
263. See id. (focusing on whether a nuisance would necessarily result from the offending
activity, the Court did not raise the requirement of nuisance per se); Jennings, 594 F.2d at 193-94
(denying injunctive relief because the future harm complained of was too uncertain and not sufficiently
severe); see also Molly McDonough, Growing Use of Nuisance, 89 A.B.A. J. 16 (Aug. 2003) (noting the
use of anticipatory nuisance as a legal theory for suing the producers of genetically modified seedsalleging that using such seeds in corn crops can contaminate the crops of other farmers and create a
public nuisance in that the food supply is thus contaminated) (citing In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab.
Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. 2002)).
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VII. THE EVOLVING SOCIAL VALUES AND ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS

The economic values developed during the industrial revolution
continue to linger and increase the complexity of the environmental
problems faced today. 264 "These values include the exploitation of natural
resources in pursuit of profit with profit deemed an adequate proxy for
social good., 265 However undervalued these resources currently are, there
has been increasing legislative and judicial awareness that these resources
are finite and easily damaged.26 6
A. The Age of EnvironmentalEnlightenment
In the late 1960s, during a generation of protests and intergenerational
conflicts, the concept of irreparable environmental harm was recognized.
The New York Times wrote that "[t]he most dangerous... enem[y] is man's
own undirected technology" and explained that "radioactive poisons,"
"runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers," "smog from automobiles," "and
the destruction of topsoil.., are examples of the failure to foresee and
control the untoward consequences of modem technology., 267 Perhaps in
concert with these sentiments, Congress enacted several statutes in the next
two decades to protect the environment: the Clean Air Act 268 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act 269 the National Environmental Policy
Act; 270 the Clean Water Act; 27 1 the Toxic Substances Control Act;272 the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act;273 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.274
264. Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go?
Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm,9 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 399, 408 (1994).
265. Id.; see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 119-27 (1979) (discussing wealth maximization as an ethical concept).
266. See, e.g., Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981). "[I]t is

preferable to have chemical-waste-disposal sites than to have illegal dumping in rivers, streams, and
deserted areas." Id. at 838. After balancing the equities, the court upheld the injunction against the
disposal site and even required the defendant to excavate the site and haul the materials elsewhere. Id. at
841.
267. Editorial, By Land, Sea andAir, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1969, at 34.

268. Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
269. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, and 49 U.S.C. (2000)).

270. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
271.

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (2000)).
272. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
273. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).

274. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 and in scattered sections
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Many states are enacting environmental legislation to prevent pollution
by public regulation rather than by providing damages to injured persons,
shifting the emphasis from compensation to prevention. 27 5 The California
legislature, exercising laudable foresight, has recognized an equitable public
property right in water,276 and its courts have held that "[p]ollution of the
ground and river waters is damage to public property, as well as a direct
injury to public welfare., 277 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that there is a significant public interest in conserving and protecting wild
animals as well as other natural resources.2 78
Other judicial decisions also began to reflect this awareness of
In Reserve Mining Company v. E.P.A., the
environmental risk.279
Environmental Protection Agency brought an action under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act's injunctive provisions against a mining plant
to abate a discharge of carcinogenic mine tailings. 280 The statute required
that the pollution source be "presenting an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health ...or to the welfare of persons., 28 ' The court
interpreted this to mean that a threat of harm, but not actual harm, was
sufficient to justify injunctive relief even though studies had shown
inconclusive results.28 2 This holding is indicative of a larger trend in legal
attitudes whereby, unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts, the courts
were now willing to interfere in situations where the environmental
consequences were uncertain.283 Courts often wrestle with environmental
issues. In Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., the court dissolved a
permanent injunction against a junkyard even though the court admitted
that the yard created air and sound pollution.2 4 In discussing the
of 26, 33, and 49 U.S.C. (2000)).
275. See 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.0313][c], at 4A-216
(2004). "The recent growth of federal and state environmental pollution laws has been designed to

prevent pollution by public regulation rather than provide damages to persons injured. The
compensation of victims of environmental pollution has been incidental to the accomplishment of the
pnmary purpose." Id.
276. CALIFORNIA WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).

277. Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Super. Ct., 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); see also Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (9th Cir.

1986) (stating that all water in Oregon belongs to the state and the discharge of oil into such water is a
cause of action from which damages may be collected).
278.

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979).

279. For a good discussion of this judicial trend, see Silver, supranote 32, at 88-89.
280. Reserve Mining Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975).
281. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (2000); see also MANATrt ET AL.,
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED BY RELEASES OF

HAZARDOUS WASTE 18-20 (1983) (discussing this provision of the Clean Water Act).
282.
"reasonable
283.
284.

Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d at 514-16, 520, 528. The court, in fact, gave the plant a
time" to stop the discharge because of the cost to the plant and to the public. Id.at 538.
Silver, supra note 32, at 89.
Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1126 (7th Cir. 1976). "This case
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environmental impact, the court recognized that junked automobiles are
"one of this country's major solid waste disposal problems" and that this
junkyard served a valuable purpose in recycling used metals. 285 Even state
legislatures attempt to balance economic development and environmental
quality. The Maryland legislature has stated that "[e]ach person has a
fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment. 286
B. The Role of Technology
At common law, one of the greatest difficulties for environmental
plaintiffs is proving the required element of causation between an action
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environmental effects is evolving, the causation requirement can create an
insurmountable hurdle for environmental claims because courts may find
the harm too uncertain or difficult to ascertain.28 8
The inherent vagueness of anticipatory nuisance and the
unpredictability of the standards of proof, as seen, "require plaintiffs to
shoulder the enormous burden of proving that a defendant's conduct will
very probably, or almost certainly, injure them. 2 89 Many courts deny relief
in anticipatory nuisance actions because the harm is uncertain and, if the
threatened harm does occur, the plaintiff still has a remedy by bringing a
presents the very difficult question of how to balance the legitimate demands of an urban neighborhood
for clean air and a comfortable environment against the utility and economic enterprise of a beneficial,
but polluting, industry." Id. at 1109.
285. Id. at I110.
286. Maryland Environmental Policy Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. I § 1-302(d) (2000). The
statute continues by stating that "[the determination of an optimum balance between economic
development and environmental quality requires the most thoughtful consideration of ecological,
economic, developmental, recreational, historic, architectural, aesthetic, and other values." Id at § I302(0; cf Jamee Jordan Patterson, California Land Use Regulation Post Lucas: The History and
Evolution of Nuisance and Public Property Laws Portend Little Impact in California, 11 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175 (1993) (describing in depth the nuisance law in respect to environmental
resources in California).
287. See GRAD, supra note 275, § 4A.03[3][b], at 4A-215 (stating proof of causation is "the
most difficult burden that a plaintiff carries in a toxic tort case"); JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0.
MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 622-23 n.8 (2d ed. 1992) (commenting that

the difficulty in establishing causation, especially with chronic as opposed to acute toxicity, has led
some plaintiffs to use, with mixed success, theories of emotional distress or "cancerphobia"); Daniel A.
Farber, Toxic Causation,71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1226-37 (1987) (discussing the causation problem in
the context of exposure to toxic chemicals); Ronald J. Rychlak, Common-Law Remedies for
Environmental Wrongs: The Role ofPrivateNuisance, 59 MiSS. L.J. 657, 681-86 (1989) (describing, in
depth, the causation problems an environmental plaintiff might face).
288. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1203-10 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the plaintiffs' claims of causation because experts were not able to express reasonable medical
certainty).
289. Doane, supra note 9, at 455; see also Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465,
474 (1st Cir. 1960) ("[T]o secure an injunction against a neighbor's prospective use of his property,
more must be shown than the mere possibility or even probability of harm resulting from that use.").
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claim for an actual nuisance. 290 Because attaining this level of proof is so
costly and difficult, technologically intensive uses of land will often be
allowed despite the potential harm involved. 291 "[F]ormal technology
assessment laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act [and the]
Clean Air Act," can aid courts in assessing potential threats of harm from
heavy industry.292
"In the United States, [there is] a complex environmental paradigm
where job creation, energy development and growth control clash with
critical concerns of biodiversity, wilderness protection and open space
preservation.' 293 In an unusual display of confidence in modem science,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Wood v. Picillo, held that a hazardous
waste dump site could contaminate a neighbor's water supply. 294 In doing
so, the court reversed its 1934 decision in Rose v. Socony- Vacuum Corp., 295
concluding that
the courses of subterranean waters are no longer obscure and
mysterious.... [D]ecades of unrestricted emptying of industrial
effluent into the earth's atmosphere and waterways has rendered
oceans, lakes, and rivers unfit for swimming and fishing, rain
acidic, and air unhealthy. Concern for the preservation of an
often precarious ecological 296balance.., has today reached a
zenith of intense significance.
The Wood court found that "the scientific and policy considerations that
290. See McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apartments, Ltd., 543 P.2d 150, 153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)
(refusing to enjoin use of easement for the hauling of sand and gravel because the activity may never
take place); Wood v. Town of Wilton, 240 A.2d 904, 908 (Conn. 1968) (holding that plaintiffs may
petition for an injunction if a dump later creates a nuisance); Larsen v. Vill. of Lava Hot Springs, 396
P.2d 471, 476 (Idaho 1964) (refusing to enjoin proposed sewage lagoon at the behest of motel owner);
Hays v. Hartfield L-P Gas, 306 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (mentioning that plaintiffs can try
to enjoin the use of a propane tank if it later creates a nuisance); Turner v. City of Spokane, 235 P.2d
300, 303 (Wash. 1951) (concluding that plaintiffs may enjoin the plant if it actually becomes a
nuisance).
291. See generally Hays, 306 N.E.2d at 377 (denying an injunction against a 30,000 gallon
propane tank to be built within 300 feet of plaintiff's home); Turner, 235 P.2d at 303 (disallowing an
injunction against a rock crushing plant to be built within a residential neighborhood); Purcell v. Davis,
50 P.2d 255, 259 (Mont. 1935) (refusing to issue an injunction against the construction of an oil refinery
within 273 yards of plaintiff's home).
292.

1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.5(C), at 57

(1986). These statutes cover industries such as "power plants, chemical plants, and pulp mills" requiring
stringent standards for industry compliance. Id. However, the technology assessment is not as well
developed for other subjects of anticipatory nuisance claims such as "bus depots, dry cleaning
establishments, [and] shooting ranges." Id.
293. Robert W. Collin, EnvironmentalEquity: A Law and PlanningApproach to Environmental
Racism, II VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 495 (1992) (footnote omitted).
294. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1249 (R.I. 1982).
295. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934).
296. Wood, 443 A.2d at 1249.
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impelled" a different result in the nearly identical Rose case were "no
longer valid. 297 As technology becomes more sophisticated and more is
learned about the impact of certain activities on the environment, the threats
cannot be addressed adequately after the fact will become more
of harm that
298
apparent.
VIII. ELIMINATING UNCONSIDERED ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES
An equitable injunction has been recognized as a means for enforcing
public policy and, as a result, this field has expanded to provide protection
not only for public and social interests but property interests as well.299
This incorporation of equity into judicial decisionmaking is not nve 300
The court's role in evaluating anticipatory nuisance claims is one of
interpretation and application of public policy. Although it is primarily the
legislature's role to define public policy, the judiciary "should continue to
be translators of economic principles" to achieve economic fairness and
efficiency. 30 ' The application of a correct balancing test and the flexibility
offered by conditional injunctions allows courts to achieve economic
fairness and efficiency by eliminating unconsidered environmental
externalities.
A. Environmental ExternalitiesToday
Individuals and corporations both tend to act in their own self-interest.
Industry and other productive uses of land that are beneficial economically
to the owners have been favored by the legislatures and courts, and this
allows landowners to create environmental externalities. °2 The landowner

297. Id.
298. See Chris G. Whipple, Fundamentalsof Risk Assessment, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10190, 10195
(1986) (discussing the rapidly evolving field of risk assessment and how its application to environmental
health risks has resulted in more explicit analyses). See generally Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and
Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 83, 86-89 (discussing the issues involved with identifying the causes of latent injuries).
299. See People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Cal. 1941) (discussing the changing use of
"equity injunctions").
300. See FREDERIC 0. SARGENT ET AL., RURAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING FOR SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES 148-61 (1991) (discussing how to evaluate equitable issues in land-use planning);
Harvey M. Jacobs, Social Equity in Agricultural Land Protection, 17 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 21
(1989) (developing a framework for social equity).
301. Smith, supra note 1, at 740; see also Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism,
86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 891 (1988) ("But often two or more outcomes will be reasonable, and the choice
among reasonable outcomes is an open one, though not, [as] argued, precisely a legislative one.").
302. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) (describing the impact of the
industrial revolution on application of tort theory); Belz, supra note 53, at 1018 (discussing how the
imperative for economic development altered property relationships in the name of economic liberty).
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will use his property in the most economically productive fashion-often to
the detriment of the environment. Consequently, the landowner is gaining a
benefit but not paying for the repercussions and damage to the environment;
this is an externality. 30 3 Society absorbs these costs through increased
medical expenses due to an escalating incidence of respiratory disease and
increased risk of cancer due to air pollution; reductions of property values
due to the presence of polluting industries; and the loss of wetlands, forests,
and biodiversity through development. 3 4
B. The Unique Advantages ofAnticipatory Nuisance Actions to Avoiding
EnvironmentalExternalities
Although the federal and state legislatures have enacted statutes that
provide for environmental causes of action, the common law of nuisance
provides "the 'oldest and perhaps most useful legal theory' for
environmental plaintiffs. 30 5 Many of the statutory actions provided in
environmental legislation are not really useful for the average plaintiff
because there is often a large imbalance of resources between an individual
plaintiff and the typical corporate defendant.306 A nuisance suit does not
require compliance with the complex procedures and the scientific evidence
that are often necessary in actions under statutory environmental claims. 0 7
Additionally, a plaintiff can maintain a common law nuisance action even if
the offending activity is legal.308 In a nuisance action, a plaintiff can simply
303. See Of Bees and Lighthouses, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at 72 (describing and
defining environmental externalities).
304. See Joseph J. Romm & Christine A. Ervin, How Energy PoliciesAffect Public Health, Ill
PUB. HEALTH REP. 390, 394 (1996) (discussing the economic impact of pollution on the population's
respiratory health, allergies, and the ozone layer-saying that "[d]eaths from asthma have increased
more than 90% since 1979"); Scott Lehigh, STOP THE NOISE! Longingfor the Sounds ofSilence in a
Polluted World, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1996, at 71 (discussing the effects of noise as a pollutant);
Frederick M. Muir, Running on Fumes-Those Who Want to Exercise Facea Dilemma: Brave the Smog
and Possibly Face Health Problems, or Become a Couch Potato, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at 2B
(observing that "[t]he mercury is rising, the sun is shining and the blue sky is, well, it's turning kind of a
grayish shade of brown").
305. Rychlak, supra note 287, at 661 (quoting Peter F. Langrock, Class Action Litigation, 25
TRIAL 46, 47-48, (Oct. 1989)). See generally Michael D. Riseberg, Comment, Exhuming The Funeral
Home Cases: ProposingA PrivateNuisance Action Based on the Mental Anguish Caused by Pollution,
21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 557, 559 (1994) (utilizing the private nuisance doctrine when physical
invasion is lacking).
306. Rychlak, supra note 287, at 661.
307. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (2000) (Solid Waste Disposal Act's sixty-day notice
requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(bXXA) (2000) (Clean Air Act's sixty-day notice requirement);
Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 31 (1989) (holding that the sixty-day notice requirement in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000), is to be strictly construed).
308. See, e.g., Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Van Tassell, 166 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1957) (holding that operation of a piggery was a public nuisance despite legality of the operation); Heinl
v. Pecher, 198 A. 797, 800 (Pa. 1938) (stating that a permit or compliance with regulations, will not
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allege "that the pollution... 'looks bad, smells bad, and does bad things' to
the plaintiffl]-without getting mired in the scientific underpinnings. '3 °9
"The beauty of the simple nuisance ...case is that it reduces the case to
terms a layperson can understand:
'You dumped it, it hurt me or my
'310
property, and you should pay. '
C. The TraditionalBalancing Test and Changing PublicPolicy
The traditional balancing test considers the harm to the plaintiff and the
benefits to society. It undervalues natural resources. 3 1 Resources,
renewable and non-renewable, are treated as free goods-valueless until
thw,
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many environmental economists have suggested that the economic value of
natural resources is their "true" value or replacement cost.3 13 Additionally,
other parties have suggested that the potential severity of harm to the
environment should be considered 31 4 when determining the relief available
to anticipatory nuisance plaintiffs. 31 5 Anticipatory nuisance actions can
provide a flexible remedy in that courts can apply a balancing test that
shield the defendant from an action for a private nuisance). See generally Grinblat, supra note 22
(explaining the use and limitations of nuisance as a response to large scale hog operations).
309. Langrock, supra note 305, at 47. But see GRAD, supra note 275, § 4A.03[3][a], at 4A200.2 (stating that compliance with regulations may be a defense to a public nuisance suit).
310. Langrock, supra note 305, at 48. Langrock was plaintiffs counsel in two significant
environmental class action cases: Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) and Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
311. PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A DECLARATION OF SUSTAINABILITY 2
(1993).
The least-price economy rewards you for what you don't do .... It gives
incentives to manufacture products at the lowest price and to avoid paying for the
downstream, intergenerational effects of your activity. Those costs are considered
a societal problem, not a commercial one ....
That is industrialism.
Alan H. Badiner, Natural Capitalism, YOGA J., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 64, 67 (interviewing Paul Hawken,
author of THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE).

312. Id.
313. See James P. Karp, Sustainable Development: Toward a New Vision, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
239, 248 (1994) (explaining that until recently American industry did not consider environmental costs);
ROBERT REPETrO, WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME 32-35 (1986) (discussing proper resource pricing in
various economic sectors); William D. Ruckelshaus, Toward a Sustainable World, 261 SCI. AM., 166,
169 (Sept. 1989) (suggesting that "[t]he way to avoid the tragedy of the commons-to make people pay
the full cost of a resource use-is to close the loops in economic systems").
314. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 9 (William

Kaufmann, Inc. 1974) (1972) ("I am quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to forests,
oceans, rivers, and other so-called 'natural objects' in the environment-indeed, to the natural
environment as a whole."); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of
American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he public trust is a fundamental
doctrine in American property law and should be recognized much more widely than it is today").
315. See generally Sharp, supra note 10 (discussing anticipatory nuisance as a means of
addressing environmental harms); Williams, supranote 15 (discussing the same).
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reflects appropriately the true costs, risks, and benefits to society and may
issue a permanent or temporary injunction to ensure economic efficiency.
By adding the true cost of environmental harm and the potential severity of
the harm to the balancing test, which already considers other social costs
and benefits, a standard is created that reduces environmental externalities
and is truly economically efficient and thereby reasonable.
CONCLUSION

For the past century, society has accepted environmental externalities
as the price of technological advancement. However, there has been a shift
away from the traditional societal-legislative-judicial subsidy of industry to
a more enlightened stance by those institutions that recognize the value of
environmental resources. This enlightened perspective should be reflected
in judicial application of nuisance law. Both the federal and state courts
should employ the anticipatory nuisance doctrine in a way that reflects the
reasonableness of today's society. An appropriate determination of what
land uses are reasonable and economically beneficial to society would
account for environmental damage. An adjusted balancing test, which
considers environmental costs and potential severity of harm, and an
increased use of temporary injunctions, would allow courts to force users of
land to internalize all of their costs. Only when the economic evaluation of
new land uses considers all the actual costs and potential consequences of
an activity will the environmental externalities be eliminated and a truly
reasonable approach to anticipatory nuisance be established.
By recalibrating the time-honored balancing test as Justice Howard C.
Ryan of the Illinois Supreme Court did in Wilsonville,316 a great judicial
opportunity is opened for testing the validity of a claim for relief under
anticipatory nuisance. Under the Ryan test, a court, in deciding an action
for anticipatory nuisance, will weigh merely the degree of potential harm
and then proceed to analyze the likelihood that the specific injury will
3 17
occur.
The more severe the potential harm, the less certain it must be to
occur in order to issue injunctive relief.318 And, contrariwise, if the harm is
not very severe, then a much higher likelihood of occurrence should be
required before an injunction will lie.3 19
316. See supraPart HII.
317. Viii. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 426 N.E.2d. 824, 842 (Il1. 1981) (Ryan, J., concurring).
Judge Ryan observed that under the more restrictive standard, "a person engaged in an ultrahazardous
activity with potentially catastrophic results would be allowed to continue until he has driven an entire
community to the brink of certain disaster." Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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This balancing standard offers, if not a sound resolution to the
problems that anticipatory nuisance poses, at least a template for fairminded judicial decisionmaking. Judge Ryan's balancing test places the
proper emphasis on the gravity of the harm in resolving these claims. In
addition, while Ryan does not mention this, under his balancing test a court
Restatement of Torts Section 827 to
could look to the factors laid out in3 20
help decipher the gravity of the harm.
The Ryan construct would allow courts to have more solid foundations
upon which to base their decisions. It will lead to more predictability in
decisions and, in the long run, will encourage plaintiffs to pursue
anticipatory nuisance causes of action when the action is most
annnrnrintP----nnmelv when the. nntentinl hqrm iq the cr.ateqt

Heretofore, the current burden of proof for a plaintiff to meet under a
claim for anticipatory nuisance has been set so unrealistically high by the
courts and the two states (Georgia and Alabama) legislating in this area,
that it acts as a disincentive, and dissuades suits from being maintained.
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, as clarified and rehabilitated herein,
has the real potential to serve as a significant and valuable tool to not only
prevent waste and environmental degradation, but also, consistent with the
early common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, to
assure the reasonable use of land.32'

320. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
321. See generally Smith, supra note 1, at 688 (stating that the maxim of sic utere tuo was
followed in nuisance law in post-colonial America and in nineteenth-century America).

